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# RECKLESS TRAGEDY: IRREVERSIBLE?

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A survey of Human  
Rights Violations and  
Losses Suffered by  
Commercial Farmers  
and Farm Workers in  
Zimbabwe  
from 2000 to 2008

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JAG and GAPWUZ

Report prepared by the Research and  
Advocacy Unit (RAU)

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## **Introduction<sup>1</sup>**

Whilst the deleterious economic effects of the Zimbabwean Government's "Fast Track Land Reform Programme" have received wide attention over the last few years, little has been done to comprehensively investigate the means by which some 4000 white commercial farmers and their families were forcibly evicted from their farms, or how a population of at least 1.3 million farm workers was subjected to 8 long years of political violence, intimidation and torture.

Indeed, the recent political agreement between the MDC and ZANU PF has not yet brought an end to the violence on the farms. At the time of writing this report farm seizures and political violence perpetrated by ZANU PF continue. Indeed the authors of this report believe that clause 5.5 of the agreement, which describes the "land reform" as "irreversible", has actually encouraged the invasion of some of the last few remaining farms in an attempt to create a de facto situation whereby recent occupations too can be counted as "irreversible".

The political agreement as it stands is too vague for any detailed commentary. However, a few points should be made:

- describing the "land reform" as "irreversible" negates any possibility of economic recovery for Zimbabwe
- farmers and farm workers, who drove the engine of Zimbabwe's economy, should be involved in the country's reconstruction
- farmers and farm workers should be considered in the allocation of land
- entrenching current occupations by A2 farmers rewards them for the violent means they used to evict the former owners in a majority of cases<sup>2</sup>
- entrenching current occupations entrenches ZANU PF patronage structures.

It is imperative that the Government's so called "Fast Track Land Reform Programme" is recognised, not as a somewhat flawed but nobly conceived exercise, but as a calamitous, painful and unnecessary tragedy. This tragedy cannot be reversed, but the first steps on the path towards healing and reconciliation will involve the new State's investigation into the crimes committed in the name of "land reform" over the last 8 years; the prosecution of those guilty of the most serious crimes such as murder and rape, as well as the

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<sup>1</sup> As the findings of this quantitative study are numerically dense, an executive summary has not been provided.

<sup>2</sup> 70% of farmers in this survey say the current occupier was involved in violently evicting them, see p. 13.

prosecution of those senior figures who either gave orders that such crimes be committed or who were in a position to stop the atrocities and did nothing; and finally, the financial compensation for losses sustained by victims as a result of these illegal actions.

## **Methodology**

This report describes the findings of a quantitative survey of human rights violations and consequential losses suffered by farmers and farm workers following land invasions in Zimbabwe from 2000 onwards. The survey forms one part of a series of research projects aimed at accurately documenting the crimes that took place on the farms throughout the Zimbabwean Government's "Land Reform". The five sections of the research project are as follows:

1. Qualitative survey of farmers
2. Quantitative survey of farmers (the present study)
3. Qualitative survey of farm workers
4. Quantitative survey of farm workers
5. Quantitative and Qualitative analysis of documentation obtained from farmers and farm workers.

A survey known as the "Damages Questionnaire" ("DQ" – see Appendix 1) was designed in early 2007 as a global survey to provide quantitative information on the following topics:

- Violations against farmers
- Violations against farm workers
- Efforts to use the justice system to protect farmers and their rights
- Damages and losses incurred by farmers
- Loss of support and services to commercial farm workers.

The DQ was designed to be completed by farmers and thus represents their views of the violations on their farms. A companion project is currently underway to obtain similar quantitative information from commercial farm workers.

The DQ was distributed via email to all members of the Justice for Agriculture Members Association (JAGMA) and also through direct contact with farmers in Harare. All surveys that were completed and returned were entered into a purpose-built Microsoft Access database, and then exported into Excel where the results were analysed.

Each record was individually verified in Excel to ensure the reliability of the data. Of the initial 481 respondents, 63 records were identified as being incomplete<sup>3</sup>,

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<sup>3</sup>For example, some respondents had only filled in the sections on financial damages.

unreliable<sup>4</sup> or duplicated<sup>5</sup> in other records. These were removed leaving a total of 418 records. In addition, several fields were removed as it was discovered that two slightly different versions of the DQ had circulated, and thus some respondents had answered questions that had not been put to others. All data that was not comparable from one DQ to another was removed from analysis. To a great extent this explains the minor disparities that exist between this consolidated report and the preliminary report, *Injury in Addition to Insult*, which was produced as an indicator of the results the project was likely to uncover.

These 418 records were then digitally linked with the geographical properties they referred to, using the Geographical Information System (GIS) software package ArcInfo. In 32 cases, it was impossible to match the record to the correct property for one of the following reasons:

- the farm name in the record was an operating name but the ArcInfo shapefile used a title deed name, or vice versa
- more than one farm of the same name existed in the same district
- the farm names in the ArcInfo shapefile were misspelt.

Thus a total of 386 records were matched with their appropriate properties for the purpose of GIS analysis, but the sample used for statistical purposes still consists of 418 records.

### **Issues arising from the Methodology**

As this report will go on to make several estimates about the national situation by extrapolating from the records in our sample, it is important to discuss some of the shortfalls in the sampling technique.

Firstly, the sample was not randomized. An email was sent out to all JAGMA members and further contact was made directly with as many farmers as possible. No one was turned away or denied participation; all the returned DQs were entered into the database. This “shotgun” approach probably means that to some extent a degree of self-selection will be present in the sample.

Secondly, these DQ's were in some instances filled out at JAG with the aid of office staff but in other cases were completed unassisted. Thus it is possible that

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<sup>4</sup> Some respondents confused the sections on farmer and worker violations and thus gave various absurd or impossible responses, answering for example, that 200 people in their family has been assaulted, or that they had sought 166 court orders to stop violence on their farms.

<sup>5</sup> Some farmers had completed multiple DQ's. Other multiple farm owners had completed separate DQ's for individual farms.

some questions have been interpreted in different ways by those farmers who completed the survey unassisted<sup>6</sup>. In addition, it is clear that there is a possible motivation in some instances for a farmer to exaggerate his or her circumstances.

It should be noted, however, that the qualitative research project which conducts narrative interviews with farmers has largely verified the extent of the violations described in the DQ's. The preliminary report on the qualitative research, "Destruction of Zimbabwe's Backbone Industry in Pursuit of Political Power", should be read in conjunction with this one. It gives a voice and identity to the hundreds of thousands of victims described here in numbers and statistics.

All these concerns will lead us to err on the side of caution when making estimates and predictions about the population of commercial farmers as a whole.

Finally, the survey data was entered over a period of two years but this report makes the assumption that the data remained static through time. As the situation on the ground for the commercial farmer is often volatile - witness the recent retributive post-election violence - this assumption does not always hold true. However, as we assume that the completion of a DQ means that no further losses, evictions or violence can take place on a farm, this will only serve to make our estimates even more conservative.


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<sup>6</sup> For example, in the question "Have you or your family experienced any of the following violations...?" the word "experience" appears in a few cases to have been given wider meaning than was the intention of the authors of this report.



## Representativeness of Sample

The sample<sup>7</sup> is geographically distributed as follows:



An undated document in the hands of GAPWUZ gives information from the Commercial Farmers Union of Zimbabwe describing the initial stages of the invasions, probably from late 2000. It gives figures for the total number of farmers in each Farmers Association and by province, which allow us to measure the degree to which our sample is representative of the farming community at a national level<sup>8</sup>.

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<sup>7</sup> I.e. the 386 DQ's which were linked with corresponding farms in the GIS database.

<sup>8</sup>Note here that the "Provinces" are not entirely identical with the official provinces of Zimbabwe. This division of the country is a traditional one based on the administrative structure of the CFU. The column "Total Farmers in 2000" refers to data obtained from the CFU document described in the text body. This CFU document has been used for comparison purposes as the CFU have indicated to JAG that they currently do not have any records of this sort.

Province	Zone	Farmers in Sample	Total Farmers in 2000	Percentage sample represents
Central Mashonaland	1	98	688	14.2%
Manicaland	1	36	416	8.7%
Mashonaland East	1	99	806	12.3%
Mashonaland West (North)	1	106	741	14.3%
Mashonaland West (South)	1	22	312	7.1%
Masvingo	2	9	245	3.7%
Matabeleland	2	8	464	1.7%
Midlands	2	8	278	2.9%
Not represented on GIS		32	-	-
Grand Total		418	3950	10.6%

Note that the total number of farmers described in this CFU document is 3950. Estimates for the total number of commercial farmers active in Zimbabwe in January 2000 normally vary from 3800 to 4500; for example, Selby estimates it at 4200<sup>9</sup>.

Both the table and the map above make it quite clear that whilst our sample is very strong in the north-east, around Harare, especially in the three Mashonaland provinces and in Manicaland – here called Zone 1 - it represents only a small percentage in the south-west, around Bulawayo, in Matabeleland, Midlands and Masvingo – here called Zone 2. This means that the predictions and extrapolations made in the final chapter of this report will be done separately for Zones 1 and 2 before being amalgamated.

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
<sup>9</sup> *Commercial Farmers And The State: Interest Group Politics And Land Reform In Zimbabwe*, Angus Selby, University of Oxford, Brasenose College, PhD Thesis, 2006

## **Results**

### **Demographic Characteristics of the Sample**

#### **Age**

Of the 418 respondents, 411 gave their ages. The oldest, at the time of completing the survey, was 87, the youngest 25. The mean age of respondents was 56.67 years. This age data is distributed as follows:




The data is interesting as it shows the low number of young farmers; only 5.37% of the sample is aged under 40. The population of white commercial farmers was – and is – an aging population. However, it should be noted that for some farmers several years have passed since they were evicted from their farms, and they were thus five or six years younger at the time of eviction.

In addition, it is possible that a form of self-selection is in operation here with respondents. It is possible that some younger farmers have not participated in this survey because they have managed to reconstruct their lives, develop new careers and move on whilst older respondents still living in Harare have not been so fortunate. This would possibly skew the sample slightly towards older farmers.

## Nationality

The sample report the following nationalities at the time of completing the survey:



The great majority of respondents describe themselves as Zimbabweans, with British and South African being the next two biggest groups. This is significant because the Government of Zimbabwe went to considerable lengths to disown its citizens, whom it preferred to describe – wrongly – as British. This vexed question of nationality and Zimbabwean-ness is at the centre of the deep sense of grievance felt by many farmers in the light of the State-sponsored attack against them.

In addition, the Government's 2001 law prohibiting dual nationality<sup>10</sup> represented a further step in the polarisation between "true" Zimbabweans and "aliens". Many people, 31.6% of our sample, describe themselves as being forced to renounce one of their dual citizenships in the wake of this law. For those who took the difficult and emotional decision to renounce their Zimbabwean citizenship, renunciation should not be interpreted too harshly; after several years of sustained attack from the Zimbabwean Government, both physical and psychological, and living in great uncertainty as to their future, farmers were anxious to ensure that should they need to leave the country they would be able to do so. Holding a passport other than Zimbabwean was clearly the best insurance strategy to deal with such an emergency.

<sup>10</sup> Act 12 of 2001 amending the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act Chapter 4:01

From the total of 418 respondents, only 56 farmers describe themselves as neither a) Zimbabwean, nor b) forced to renounce dual citizenship. This means that 13.4% of farmers in the sample were of foreign nationalities with no rights to Zimbabwean citizenship.

## Current Residence

Another significant finding concerning the demographics of the sample is the current residence of respondents, which is as follows:

Current Residence	Count	Percentage
Asia	2	0.5%
Europe	3	0.7%
North America	5	1.2%
Unknown	8	1.9%
UK	12	2.9%
SADC	14	3.3%
South Africa	25	6.0%
Australia or New Zealand	39	9.3%
Zimbabwe	310	74.2%

This is very revealing. One would expect that the stereotyped settler farmer with strong emotional and ancestral ties to Britain would return to the UK once evicted, but only 2.9% of the sample obeyed the orders of War Veterans to “go back to Britain”. In fact, of the 66 respondents with British citizenship, no fewer than 46, or 70%, of them are still resident in Zimbabwe, despite the traumatic events of the last 8 years.

Indeed, the 6% of farmers living in South Africa, in conjunction with the 7% of South Africans in the sample, suggest that there is an equally strong, if not stronger, link to South Africa. At any rate, the 74.2% of the sample still residing in Zimbabwe suggests that the respondents have stronger ties to Zimbabwe than they do to any other country, as is also seen in the 70% of respondents describing themselves as Zimbabwean.

In addition, it seems that the tales of Zimbabwean farmers moving in large numbers to neighbouring SADC countries to conduct farming operations is something of an exaggeration.

One point should be borne in mind however: as the DQ was conducted from an office in Harare using email, telephone and direct contact, it is possible that the sample under-represents farmers living abroad. It was evident, for example, that there was a small amount of resistance to completing the DQ by email as it was a fairly lengthy document (see Appendix 1). This means that those farmers to whom it was emailed – and mainly those outside of Zimbabwe – are likely to be under-represented. It is also possible that those farmers who have left the

country and are now abroad have, to some extent, rebuilt their lives and livelihoods and are thus less motivated to participate in this survey.

The following countries of residence were aggregated into the above table<sup>11</sup>: Zimbabwe (310), Australia (32), South Africa (25), UK (12), Zambia (9), New Zealand (7), Canada (3), USA (2), Malawi (2), Ireland (1), Tanzania (1), China (1), Botswana (1), Portugal (1), Mozambique (1), Indonesia (1) and the Netherlands (1).

### **Still Living on the Farm**

The sample counts 34 farmers, or 8.1%, as still living on their farms. This figure is roughly comparable with other estimates<sup>12</sup>. However, follow up contacts with those respondents who indicated that they were still farming showed that about half of this number have been evicted subsequent to their filling out the DQ. It is important to realise, though, that this figure probably does not tell the whole story. The question in the DQ, "Are you still living on the farm?", does not provide information about other farming activities being conducted by respondents, such as leasing a neighbour's farm or running a reduced herd of cattle somewhere else.

Anecdotal evidence suggests that there is a considerable number of farmers (perhaps 15%) still conducting much reduced operations in one way or another. At this point it is perhaps important to point out that these kinds of small partnerships and operations are in some instances conducted on the land of other evicted farmers without their permission. These kinds of activities are often bitterly resented by the former owners and are viewed as constituting a form of betrayal. JAG continues to advise all farmers wishing to conduct operations on someone else's land to contact the former owner before proceeding.

### **The Current Occupier(s)**

Of the sample, 70% reported that they knew who was currently occupying their farm, and 70% reported that the occupier had been directly involved in evicting the farmer. Whilst this is in some sense expected, too often a familiarity with the situation on the ground leads us to forget how outrageous a statistic like this actually is. In effect, the State repeatedly rewarded violent actions against farmers by assigning farms to the perpetrators of those crimes.

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<sup>11</sup> In rank order, with number of respondents in brackets. 8 respondents did not complete this part of the DQ.

<sup>12</sup> For example Selby (2006) estimates that by July 2005 there were 500 remaining farmers.

This means that the vested interests of criminals on the farms were actually encouraged by the inactivity of the police and the ineffective justice system. In most cases a farmer would be approached by the new farmer – often with offer letter in hand – long before the farm had been legally acquired by the State. Indeed, these new occupiers formed the very backbone of the strategy to evict farmers. Anecdotal evidence from the companion qualitative project shows the extent to which these new occupiers would increase their efforts to remove the farmers illegally, moving from politely civil to dangerously violent when met with increasing levels of resistance.

It should be remembered that – although this question was not asked in the DQ – the preliminary report on the qualitative interviews, “Destruction of Zimbabwe’s Backbone Industry in Pursuit of Political Power”, counts 100% of the 70 odd farmers in that survey as having been evicted illegally in terms of the laws of Zimbabwe. In addition, the report supports the JAG opinion that to date 100% of all farmers throughout the country have been evicted illegally, without the order of a competent court. It should be noted here that the term “illegally” is used to mean in contravention of the laws of Zimbabwe, laws which, in the opinion of many farmers, were already unjust before they were flouted by the State.

### **Farm Residents**


The 418 farmers in the sample record the following populations of farm workers:

	Full-Time Employees	Part –Time Employees	Employee Family Members Resident on the Farm
Total	34,520	33,369	156,911
Ave per Farmer	83	80	375

An additional field, “Farm Residents”, was calculated by adding “Full-Time Employees” to “Employee Family Members”. This total did not include “Part-Time Employees” as in a majority of cases, casual and temporary workers were drawn from the family members of full-time workers. The total number of Farm Residents for the 418 respondents is thus 191,431, or an average of 458 Farm Residents per farm.




Before considering the violations perpetrated against farmers and their farm workers, it is important to understand the spread of this population of farm workers in Zimbabwe. Our sample reports total numbers of farm workers as



follows:

The map shows quite clearly where all the Farm Residents are situated in our sample. This is important to understand for two reasons. Firstly, our sample is considerably biased towards the north east of the country, so this massive differential in resident numbers between, say, Mashonaland West and the Midlands, is partly an effect of sampling technique. Secondly, violations occur in greater numbers where more people live. We would thus expect Mashonaland West, for example, to report a considerably greater number of violations than either of the Matabeleland provinces.

However, if we consider the average number of Farm Residents living on each farm, we see that there is still a differential of a similar kind. This is simply because the Mashonaland and Manicaland farms tend to be smaller more intensive units, with higher populations of employees.



This general pattern of both higher rates and higher totals in the Mashonaland and Manicaland regions will be repeated throughout the report.

## **Human Rights Violations Perpetrated against Farmers and their Farm Workers**

Before proceeding to discuss human rights violations perpetrated against farmers and their workers, it is as well to try to define what we mean by “human rights violation”. In this report the term comprehends all conduct which in Zimbabwean law amounts to a crime against the person: it includes homicide, rape, all forms of assault, kidnapping and unlawful detention. It does not include crimes against property such as robbery and theft, however brutally those crimes may have been perpetrated.

### **Binaries and Count Fields**

The DQ contained separate sections concerning farmers and their farm workers. Within each section two separate questions were asked concerning each human rights violation: did the violation occur, and if so, how many people experienced the violation. This means that there are two separate variables for each question: a binary true/false and a count figure. Many respondents evidently found it difficult to respond with any certainty about the exact number of people who had experienced a particular violation, preferring instead to answer only the true/false question. For example 259 of the 418 respondents answered yes to the question “Did your workers or their families get assaulted?”, but of those 259 only 109 felt confident enough to estimate the exact number of their workers who had been assaulted. This, in essence, means that the totals and counts for specific violations are considerably lower than the true total counts of violations that occurred on each farm, due mainly to the respondents having limited knowledge of their workers’ precise circumstances. The binary true/false field is considered a much better indicator, as only 36.51% of responses alleging a particular violation took place have an estimated number of victims in the associated count field.

In addition, it is not expected that totals and counts will include any significant level of double counting as the phrasing of questions limited the response to violations against the farmer, the workers of that farmer and their respective families. It is thus unlikely that respondents would count violations perpetrated against, for example, the workers of their neighbours.

### **Total Violations perpetrated against Farmers and Farm Workers**


In total, the 418 respondents report 82,297 violations perpetrated against farmers, farm workers and their families.

Before discussing this huge array of violations in any greater depth, it is important that we consider the aspect of time which is not covered in the DQ. The DQ makes no attempt to record the particular dates of particular violations. It is thus not possible for us to map violations in time at this stage. However, anecdotal evidence from farmers shows that violence and human rights violations were not perpetrated at constant levels over the several years of the farm invasions.

In particular, the electoral cycle played a pivotal role in the levels of violence on a farm, with violence peaking around election dates. After all, the event which initially incited the farm invasions was the “No” result to the 2000 Constitutional Referendum, itself a form of election. War Veterans and Youth Militia typically became very active on farms just prior to elections and withdrew afterwards. In addition, the wave of violence and evictions in the wake of the March 2008 elections and prior to the run-off clearly shows how violence was used by the State as a political tool to persecute opponents and intimidate the populace into voting for ZANU (PF).

### Geographical Distribution of Violations


Bearing in mind the discussion about the size of farm populations above, it should come as no surprise that our total of 82,297 violations is distributed across the country like this:




This map shows quite clearly the large number of violations recorded by the sample in the three Mashonaland Provinces, and to a lesser extent Manicaland. Violation totals in these provinces are substantially higher than in the other four provinces.

This is not simply because they were “worse” provinces; the reason the totals are so much higher is that we include many more farmers in these Mashonaland and Manicaland totals than we include in the other provinces. The 147 farmers we have in our sample from Mashonaland West are obviously going to total many more violations than the 10 from Masvingo.

When we compensate for this to find out which provinces had higher average violations per farmer, we find the following picture emerges:



This shows that even after having normalised for the biased sample, we find that the observation still holds. Farmers in Mashonaland and Manicaland still report on average much higher numbers of violations than farmers in other provinces. This confirms the commonly held view that the Mashonaland and Manicaland farmers were harder hit than others on average. This has removed the bias caused by our uneven sample.




However, we know that the Mashonaland and Manicaland provinces have, on average, much higher farm populations as the farms there are small and intensive. This high number of violations is thus to be expected because the victim population is much higher. There is a sense in which Mashonaland and Manicaland did indeed have a much “worse” time during the land invasions – violations on average and in total are higher there. However, from the point of view of the worker, or resident of the farm, we must also note that this did not mean that the worker in Matabeleland North, for example, was safe. If we divide the average violations for each farm by the number of residents to discover on average how many violations were perpetrated against each resident in the province, we find that the picture is not so clear cut. From the point of view of the farm resident, there is a more even spread of violations throughout the country. The rank order has changed considerably<sup>13</sup>.

To summarise: the three Mashonaland Provinces and Manicaland record the highest numbers of violations per farm. This is because they have high numbers of workers. From the point of view of the worker on the farm, violations were more evenly spread across the country, and workers in one part of the country were more or less equally likely to be targeted as workers in another part. This conforms to the view that the attacks on the farms have been widespread and systematic and, to a great extent, have targeted farms with large labour forces.

<sup>13</sup> Greatest to smallest: Masvingo, Mashonaland East, Matabeleland North, Mashonaland West, Manicaland, Mashonaland Central, Midlands, Matabeleland South.

## Violation Index

The Violation Index (VI) for a particular farm in the sample is calculated by adding up the yes/no binaries for the various violations. The VI is a number ranging from 0 (no violations perpetrated on that farm) to 37 (all violations in DQ perpetrated on that farm). In simple terms the VI is a count of the different types of violations that occurred on a farm and is an indicator of the severity of the human rights situation on that farm.<sup>14</sup> The VI is distributed in the sample as follows:



It is worth noting that only 6 respondents (1.4%) reported a VI of 0, that is, a complete absence of violations on their farms. The average VI was 12.82, which appears to be a mean between two peaks of a bimodal distribution. It is unclear whether this apparent bimodal distribution is a result of chance, or if there is some as yet unexplained variable in operation here.

The average of 12.82 different types of violations per respondent clearly shows the prevalence of serious human rights violations on farms in Zimbabwe.


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<sup>14</sup> Technically, the VI gives information on the spread or variety of violations on a farm and not the total number of those violations. However, for the purposes of this report it is assumed that a greater variety of violations (high VI) is likely to equate to a greater number of individual violations and thus a "worse" situation.

## Violations against Farmers and their Families

Farmers reported a total of 2,354 violations against themselves and their families. These violations were spread as follows:


### Total Violations against Farmers and their Families



There are a number of important points to make here. Firstly, as mentioned earlier, many farmers felt unable to give exact numbers of violations and only filled in the binary yes/no field; those farmers who answered yes and did not estimate the number of victims are not included in the above chart. It should be noted that the fields "Deliberate Killing or Maiming of Wildlife" and "Pet Animals Killed or Maimed" reflect these actions committed as violent intimidation to force a farmer to leave the farm; they do not refer to simple poaching. It is significant that "Death Threats" are so high; in combination with the small number (relatively speaking) of highly publicised murders, death threats were a powerful intimidation strategy for State forces, reminding farmers of the possible consequences of any resistance.



If, on the other hand, we consider the binary fields, we find that the following percentages of respondents stated that they or their families had experienced these violations:



Several observations are important. Firstly, the authors of this report consider this chart of “yes/no” binary fields to be more accurate than that of the count totals for the reasons outlined above. Secondly, the new rank orders are significant. The highest violation recorded is “Political Intimidation”; this has moved two places up the rank order. Being “Forced to Join or Contribute to ZANU PF” has also moved several places up the order. It is highly significant that of the top five violations, three of them are violations of political rights. All of these top five are reported by at least half the respondents. From data received from the companion qualitative project which interviews farmers, it is clear that the above table is a good representation of the reality on the farms, where farmers and their workers suffered sustained political attacks because of their allegiance, real or perceived, to the MDC.

This pattern of political and physical violations is repeated and intensified with farm workers (discussed below). It is this kind of evidence that has long been behind the calls by various farming representatives for the attacks against farmers and workers to be recognised as being politically motivated.

Perhaps it should be reiterated here that the very presence of any one of these violations against any single respondent of our sample should be regarded as an outrage, considering the propaganda that was publicly disseminated by the Zimbabwean Government about the “Fast Track Land Reform”<sup>15</sup>. Mugabe claimed that all that was being flouted in the invasions was “the little law of trespass”, and other Ministers and commentators in the State-run media maintained on numerous occasions that the “land reform” was a peaceful and genuine programme. In reality, it was a violent, chaotic and nationally calamitous campaign to eradicate MDC support, entrench the ZANU PF hold on power and reward ZANU PF loyalists with incidental spoils.

If the farm invasions had taken place as part of a genuine programme of land reform, most of the human-rights violations against farmers and their workers should not and would not have taken place. There would have been no justification, for example, for the assaults committed against 29% of the respondents or their family members. The Government’s excuse, that the violations were perpetrated by unruly mobs outside its control, is mere fabrication: fully 25% of respondents reported unlawful arrests and 11.24% reported unlawful detentions, both of which violations were committed by members of the Zimbabwe Republic Police. The Police were certainly under the control of the Government, and so were the “unruly mobs” (as shown in our preliminary report “Destruction of Zimbabwe’s Backbone Industry in Pursuit of Political Power”). The role of the Zimbabwe Republic Police in these events will be discussed below.


The perpetration of these human rights violations gives the lie to the Government’s claim that the exercise was a programme of “land reform”.

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<sup>15</sup> Here and elsewhere the State’s title for this period of political violence is quoted in inverted commas because it is a complete and absolute misnomer. No genuine land reform has taken place in Zimbabwe.

## Violations against Farm Workers and their Families


The sample reports a total of 79,943 violations. These violations are spread as follows:



Once again, four of the top five violations are political in nature. This statistic further undermines the Government's claim that the sole motivation for the invasions was the desire for land reform – as does the fact that the survey returns revealed 782 cases of torture that State agents perpetrated, or allowed to be perpetrated, and that 27 workers or their family members were murdered in the course of the invasions.

These figures do not need any further comment: the Government of Zimbabwe has presented no sensible explanations for these violations.

Considering the more accurate binary fields, we obtain the following picture of the situation for the workers on Zimbabwe's farms:




The top three violations are all political violations and reflect very high percentages, with over three-quarters of respondents citing them as present. Once again these figures reveal the ugly truth behind the Government's rhetoric about "Land Reform". The Government has failed to explain the extreme totals and indexes of violations against farm workers. What is starkly clear from the charts above is the true character of "Land Reform" - a violent political attack to subjugate the large populations on the farms (191,431 Farm Residents in our sample alone) in order to stamp out the nascent MDC opposition and entrench ZANU PF hegemony. This, as has been demonstrated in subsequent elections, was partially successful.

### Comparison of Violations

Most importantly, there is no easy way to illustrate a comparison of Total Violations against Farmers and Total Violations against Farm Workers as the disparity is too great. Total Violations against Farmers represent only 2.8% of the Total Violations counted in the sample, while 97.2% of the Total Violations were perpetrated against the Farm Labour. This figure again suggests the real aim of the Zimbabwean "Land Reform" programme - the enforced political submission of a large voting population.

If we consider not unmoderated totals but binaries, we find that some interesting patterns emerge:




The figure is instructive. Firstly, note how all the physically violent violations (murder, rape, torture and assault) rise from Farmers to Workers. Note also how the specific political violations of being “Forced to Join or Contribute to ZANU PF” and being “Forced to Attend Political Meetings” rise steeply from Farmers to Workers, although general “Political Intimidation” is roughly equally reported for both groups. It seems that whilst highly publicised images of Farmers writing cheques out to the MDC caused great alarm within the Government, what concerned them even more was the possibility that a Farmer might influence his Workers into holding similar political opinions. With a population amounting to well over a million people, the votes of commercial farm workers were extremely significant to Government. Past JAG reports have described how this sizeable population acted somewhat like a swing vote, between the rural ZANU PF vote and the urban MDC vote. So if the farmer was subjected to a barrage of ZANU PF slogans and denied the right to freely support the opposition if he so chose, the workers suffered even further for any political engagement outside of strict ZANU PF orthodoxy. It is these very high levels of political violations against the workers that so sharply highlight the “Land Reform” programme as a fraud.

Two violations show significant falls from Farmers to Workers: “Unlawful Arrest” and being “Held Hostage”. This also accords with practical experience of the situations on the farms. Farmers were typically arrested to put pressure on them to leave the farm. With the farmer gone, the farm could be reclaimed as a ZANU PF weapon in the patronage arsenal. Workers on the other hand were arrested less often, and most frequently in the course of reporting political violence against themselves. However, it should be noted that they were slightly more likely to be unlawfully detained.

The sharp fall in being “Held Hostage” from Farmers to Workers is explained by the near ubiquitous use of the “jambanja” as a weapon to force a farmer to leave the farm. Jambanja typically involved a farmer’s house being surrounded for several days by a group of angry (often intoxicated) War Veterans or Youth Militia along with a number of co-opted workers. These jambanjias were often violent and nearly always involved use of strong psychological intimidation, such as the constant beating of drums throughout the night, death threats, the burning of thatching, etc. Workers were not often held hostage.

If we take one binary, namely assault against farmers and workers, and plot the locations of these assaults we find the following map:



The Map depicts only assaults for Zone 1 (i.e. Manicaland, Mashonaland East, West and Central). It is obvious that we are dealing with a series of violations which are *widespread and systematic*.



## Perpetrators of Violations

### **Perpetrators of Violations against Farmers and their Families**

The perpetrators of violations against farmers and their families are as follows, in rank order for binary percentages:

Perpetrator	Total No. of Perpetrators	% citing this perpetrator
Police - Riot Squad	10	1.9%
Police - Support Unit	112	12.7%
Police – PISI	32	13.9%
President's Office	56	23.7%
Provincial Administrator	33	25.6%
Police – CID	96	26.3%
Member of Parliament	42	27.3%
Army	211	27.8%
Provincial Governor	45	29.0%
CIO	142	34.7%
Farm Employee	1100	45.9%
DA	76	50.7%
Police - Uniformed Branch	413	52.9%
ZANU PF Member	2303	72.3%
War Veterans and Youth Militia	4639	83.3%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>9310</b>	

There is one caveat to the above table: in order to keep the design of the DQ relatively simple no attempt was made to link particular violations with a specific perpetrator. It is thus not known for which violations the listed agents were responsible.

Not surprisingly, the largest total of perpetrators, as well as the highest binary percentage, was for “War Veterans and Youth Militia”. The participation of the War Veterans in land invasions has received wide publicity, as has the participation of the Youth Militia, who often claim to be War Veterans but are clearly far too young for this claim to be credible. The companion qualitative work to this survey has shown how these groups of invaders would generally be headed by one or two genuine War Veterans and would consist of about 10 Youth Militia. This group is responsible for the largest number of violations both violent and political.

It is highly significant that 52.9% of respondents say that the police were involved in these violations, even though only a moderate number of individual

policemen were cited. With the lack of police support or protection, farmers had nowhere to turn to when confronted with violence or even standard criminal activity. This led to them feeling helpless and isolated, feelings which are known to play a role in the development of trauma-related psychological conditions such as PTSD.<sup>16</sup>

It is also interesting that District Administrators should be in fourth rank order of perpetrators of violations, with over half the respondents citing the DA as a perpetrator on their farm. When considered individually, many of the other perpetrators are equally egregious. The fact that 29% of respondents cite the Provincial Governor as a perpetrator is stark evidence of State involvement in the violations, as is the 27.8% of respondents citing the involvement of the Zimbabwe National Army.

Finally, it is disconcerting that farm employees were often involved in the violations on a farm, with 45.9% of respondents citing them as perpetrators. Qualitative evidence suggests that farm employees were most likely to be perpetrators in four different scenarios:

- 1) where a minor section of farm employees actively aided the invaders, for example ZANU PF committee members;
- 2) where farm employees were violently co-opted into attacks on the farmer, for example during jambanja;
- 3) when the S.I. 6 redundancy packages were introduced by Government to drive a wedge between farmers and their workers;
- 4) when young people on the farm were forced to join the ZANU PF youth, often through forced attendance at the infamous Border Gezi youth camps where political "re-education" and indoctrination took place.

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<sup>16</sup> The companion project to this report has already disclosed that 45% of the farmers and their families that have been interviewed display symptoms that indicate clinically significant levels of trauma, and this several years after the events which caused the trauma. See the report "Destruction of Zimbabwe's Backbone Industry in Pursuit of Political Power".

## Perpetrators of Violations against Workers and their Families

The perpetrators of Violations against Workers and their Families are divided as follows:

Perpetrator	Total No. of Perpetrators	% citing this perpetrator
Police - Riot Squad	25	2.4%
Police - Support Unit	102	9.1%
Police – PISI	77	11.0%
President's Office	113	15.3%
Provincial Administrator	26	17.9%
Provincial Governor	15	19.6%
Army	141	19.9%
Police – CID	47	19.9%
Member of Parliament	109	22.0%
Farm Employee	473	24.4%
CIO	86	28.5%
District Administrator	45	36.4%
Police – Uniformed Branch	301	40.4%
ZANU PF Member	1644	63.6%
War Veterans and Youth Militia	2486	73.4%
<b>TOTAL</b>	<b>5690</b>	

It should be noted that this table represents only a broad indication of who the perpetrators were likely to be, considering that farmers seldom witnessed the violations against their employees. In addition, as discussed at several points in this report, the unmoderated totals do not give a very accurate depiction of the perpetrators, especially for farm workers. Instead, the binary fields, here in the form of a percentage describing the number of respondents citing this perpetrator, is considered to give a more accurate picture.

It is nonetheless to be noted that the four highest perpetrators are the same for both farmers and farm workers. The rank orders are very similar for both farmers and farm workers, suggesting that the same agents were used to commit violations irrespective of the victim group.

## **The Courts, the Law and the Police**

Throughout the process of “Fast Track Land Reform” farmers actively fought the Government through the courts. Indeed, several legal challenges are currently being mounted in various courts outside the country, after Constitutional Amendment No 17 removed the right of farmers to challenge the Government’s acquisition of their farm in Zimbabwean courts.

The results are as follows:

<b>Data</b>	<b>Total</b>
Objected to Designation of Farm	92.8%
Contested Designation in Admin Court	62.2%
Forcibly Evicted from Farm	74.4%
Conceded Under Duress	41.1%
Obtained Court Order to Continue Farming	21.8%
Number of Court Orders Obtained	139
Average Number of Court Orders	1.53

Not surprisingly, over 92.8% of respondents objected to the designation of their farms (designation was the first stage in the legal process by which the Government acquired a farm compulsorily). A further 62.2% of respondents actually contested the matter in the Administrative Court. This is a very high percentage, and demonstrates the pressure the country’s courts were under. The courts, and particularly the Administrative Court, were unable to cope with the volume of cases brought as a result of the Government’s decision in 2000 to acquire virtually all the commercial farmland in the country. Even if one were to accept - in the face of all the evidence - that the Government did indeed intend some sort of socially just land reform programme, it had set completely unrealistic targets that radically overstretched the meagre resources of the State.

It is interesting too that 74.4% of the respondents say they were forcibly evicted from their farm. This is supportive of JAG’s statement, given above, that 100% of the farmers in Zimbabwe have been evicted illegally - i.e. without an eviction order from a competent court - with or without the application or threatened application of force. In many cases these illegal evictions have been carried out by the police, evidently acting on instructions from their superiors.

It is not known to what extent the 74.4% of forcible evictions overlaps with the 41.1% of farmers who conceded their farms under duress. Probably some of the concessionaries were affected early on in the invasions, when the war vets and youth militia would invade a farmer's house and force him or her to sign documents conceding the farm. As farmers soon learnt, these documents were legally void. The figure of 41.1% could also include some multiple farm owners who conceded one farm in order to keep another, or even some farmers who conceded a portion of their farm under duress with the hope of being allowed unhindered access to the remaining portion.

It is interesting that whilst farmers were relatively quick to use the legal system to fight the designation and acquisition of their farms, they explored other legal avenues in a more limited way. Because it was not the standard legal advice to farmers at the time, only 21.8% of respondents sought a court order to continue farming free from interruption (many invasions occurred prior to any legal procedure to acquire the farm on the part of Government). Other information from the companion qualitative interview project suggests that very few farmers sought eviction orders against the illegal settlers on their lands, as the police almost invariably refused to enforce these. (Indeed the Rural Land Occupiers (Protection from Eviction) Act retroactively protected formerly illegal settlers from any such legal pursuit.)

Attempts to use the police to enforce various court orders were almost invariably fruitless.

Data	
Tried to get the police to enforce a court order	37%
Average number of times:	1.85
Successfully got police enforcement:	5%
Tried to get police to stop violence or intimidation against farmer or workers:	77%
Average number of times:	3.99
Consider police were helpful at least once:	29%
Average number of times police were helpful:	1.02
Sympathetic or professional policemen transferred away or removed from duties:	58%
Saw police intimidated themselves	40%

This reluctance on the part of the farmers to pursue legal avenues requiring the involvement of the ZRP is amply explained by the above table. 37% of respondents sought police enforcement of a court order an average of 1.85 times each, but only 5% reported that it was successful.

Over three-quarters of the respondents attempted to get the police to stop the violence and intimidation on four separate occasions, but only 29% reported this was helpful on even one out of those four occasions. Respondents report attempting to get police to stop violence a total of 1623 times, but received a helpful response only 417 times.

This indictment of police responsiveness would be even more damning were it not for the fact that farmers soon learnt that the police would not aid them and so ceased to call on them for assistance. The most frequent explanation given by the police for their failure to fulfil their constitutional duty was that the situation “was political”, as if this somehow exonerated them from upholding the law.

In fairness to some of the junior officers, the respondents also report in significant percentages that the police were themselves intimidated (40%). When policemen were seen to be willing to assist they were quickly transferred to new areas (58%). This strategy of ensuring that no relationships could develop between perpetrator and victim was extremely effective, and ZANU PF replicated the tactic by frequent changes of District Administrators, Provincial Administrators and Provincial Governors, and indeed the structural changes of the various organs driving the “land reform” programme. Farmers who “did the run-around” in an attempt to influence the political position in which they found themselves were often faced with recently transferred officials who were unfamiliar with the situation and did not know them; thus the sympathy which they might have received from officials with whom they had established a rapport over the years, was lost.

## Losses

### **Losses Experienced by Farmers**

As a result of this chaotic, illegal and unfair process, farmers sustained extensive losses, which could clearly have been mitigated if the police and other Government agencies had acted effectively and in a non-partisan manner. The losses given here are consequential on the unlawful invasion of the respondents' farms, invasions that were explicitly condoned and sanctioned by the Government of Zimbabwe. The companion qualitative project's preliminary report adduces substantial evidence of the extent to which State actors played a part in these processes; it summarises the situation as follows:

*the survey sample<sup>17</sup> provides ample evidence that these groups were transported, supplied and paid by Government agencies. The CIO, ZRP, ZNA and various DA's, MP's, Governors, Ministers and Judges are all implicated in the invasions reported in the survey sample, along with ZANU PF and the War Veterans.*

These consequential losses are extensive. It should be pointed out here that the table below does not refer to losses of land or improvements, as this is considered a highly contentious issue. In terms of international law, estimates for these losses should be done by professional and qualified valuers. The calculation of lost earnings were based on the last full year of farming activity, multiplied by the number of years that the farmer had been off the farm, in some cases as much as seven years. It should be noted that these figures represent estimates of losses conducted by the farmers who participated in this survey. They do not represent official JAG or GAPWUZ views of the losses sustained. In addition, they represent outside parameter figures.

<b>Loss</b>	<b>Total (US\$)<sup>18</sup></b>	<b>Average per respondent</b>
Moveable property	\$190,187,811.70	\$454,994.76
Crops	\$74,102,154.14	\$177,277.88
Property burnt	\$43,015,483.00	\$102,907.85
Earnings	\$677,736,532.00	\$1,621,379.26
Livestock	\$68,908,182.00	\$164,852.11
Medical expenses	\$3,378,957.00	\$8,083.63
Legal expenses	\$2,678,775.00	\$6,408.55

<sup>17</sup> The sample included only 71 farmers.

<sup>18</sup> References to monetary losses are given here and elsewhere in US dollars, as hyperinflation (one of the major causes of which, incidentally, is the "Fast Track Land Reform Programme") has rendered the Zimbabwean dollar valueless.

<b>Total</b>	<b>\$1,060,007,894.84</b>	<b>\$2,535,904.05</b>
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The gross estimate for total losses for the sample is over a billion dollars - a vast sum of money. Whilst the highest figure is the total for estimated lost earnings (US\$678 million), the total actual losses are also extensive (US\$382 million).

The significance of these figures will be discussed under the heading "Predictions".

### **Losses Experienced by Farm Workers**

Calculating the losses incurred by farm workers is a complex task, and at this stage of the research no consolidated attempt has been made to provide quantitative estimates of their losses, other than the schematic indications below. However, certain general observations can be made about the position farm-workers found themselves in after "fast-track land reform".

It should be remembered here that our sample of 418 farmers report a total of 191,431 Farm Residents.

Firstly, after a farmer's eviction the vast majority of the farm workers lost their jobs. In a few minor cases, certain workers did continue in the farmer's employ, or move with the farmer to a town or to another farm. This typically would represent a handful of workers at most. The workers who remained behind on the farm, living in the farm compound, often had an extremely uneasy relationship with the new farmers, whether A1 or A2. A sizeable group would continue to work on the farm for the new farmers, but with reduced wages and deteriorating working conditions. In many instances there has been a shift from permanent employment to seasonal or casual work. As the Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe (FCTZ, 2003)<sup>19</sup> reported:

*In the Mashonaland provinces surveyed in the second quarter of 2002, between 33 and 50 per cent of farm workers had stayed on despite losing their jobs. It was observed:*

*in Mashonaland West, where most farms have been taken under model A2, farm workers were still on the farms. Some were on reduced working hours which translated into a cut in remuneration. On farms that had completely stopped operations, the majority of farm workers were staying on the farm in apparent hopelessness, as they were not clear as to where to go. (45)*

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<sup>19</sup>*The situation of Commercial Farm Workers after Land Reform in Zimbabwe*, L. Sachikonye, Farm Community Trust of Zimbabwe, 2003



This FCTZ report was published in 2003. In the intervening five years even greater numbers of former workers have been displaced. For example, in *Operation Mavotera papi*, which aimed to root out MDC support in vulnerable constituencies after the first round of the 2008 election, many thousands of farm workers were displaced.

The FCTZ estimated in 2003 that about 70% of farm workers had lost their jobs and further commented:

*The loss of permanent and seasonal jobs arising from the decline in commercial farming meant that farm workers no longer received regular incomes. This is perhaps the largest single factor affecting their present capacity to sustain their livelihoods. Not that the incomes were very substantial in the first place. Farm workers have historically received some of the lowest wages in the economy (see Chapter 2). Together with domestic service workers and those in the sprawling informal sector, they form the lowest tier of income earners. Nevertheless, the incomes made all the difference between starvation and survival, between extreme poverty and access to the basic things of life. (46)*

This situation has obviously continued to deteriorate over the last five years. It should be remembered, however, that many workers did receive some form of limited compensation for the loss of their jobs in the form of the so-called Statutory Instrument 6 (S.I. 6) packages. In a masterpiece of perverted logic, the Government decreed that those farmers who were being forcibly evicted from their farms by Government should pay their workers compensation for the termination of their employment, despite the fact that these redundancies were a direct result of the Government's own illegal actions, and were completely against the will of the farmers. Incidentally, these S.I. 6 packages often resulted in no long term benefits for the workers, partly because they were sometimes squandered as workers did not fully grasp their new tenuous position regarding employment, but mainly because Zimbabwean hyperinflation wiped out all their savings and other provisions for the future.

Other losses sustained by workers would include the loss of property (arson and looting are mentioned frequently in the qualitative report), the loss of culturally significant sites (for example, access to sites where family members or ancestors are buried), losses due to physical injury and psychological trauma, losses due to relocation costs, the loss of access to cheap and plentiful food, etc. These losses are currently being estimated in the companion projects. Nonetheless, we can still discuss other losses from the data collected in the DQ.

Most significantly, many farm workers have died since losing their jobs. These deaths are related to the numerous other losses workers have sustained, such as loss of jobs, medical care, access to food and so on. The sample reports the following deaths from their workers:

Data	Total
Employee died	2751
Employees Family Members died	1445
Total	4196

It is clear that these total deaths (about 2.2% of farm residents in the sample) are likely to be a gross underestimate of the total deaths for farm workers. After their evictions many farmers severed links with their farms and farm workers; they were thus unable to accurately estimate these deaths at the time of filling in the survey. No study has yet produced a reliable estimate for this figure, but the companion project to this one, which seeks to obtain quantitative data from farm workers, is likely to produce much better estimates of these figures.

The following table outlines the educational facilities provided by respondents to the DQ. The percentages in the second column are of those giving positive answers to the questions asked.

Data	Total
Did you provide a school on the farm?	35%
Number of pupils at school:	20667
Did you subsidise pupils attending another school?	41%
Number of pupils subsidised:	5498
Was the school downsized after you left the farm?	17%
Pupils affected by downsizing:	1680
Was the school closed after you left the farm?	20%
Pupils affected by closure	1360
Annual cost of school:	\$1,021,904.00

Access to education was in many cases provided by the farmer, often in collaboration with the Ministry of Education. These farm schools suffered serious setbacks as a result of the "land reform" programme; many were closed or downsized. This was partly because of the allied attacks on teachers that took

place across the country, as teachers, like farmers, were perceived to be influential supporters of the MDC. Of the 143 respondents who provided a school on the farm, 53 reported that the school had been downsized, and 64 that the school had been closed. In other words, of the 143 farm schools in the sample, 117 (82%) had either been closed or downsized - a significant proportion.

It should be noted that the unmoderated totals given above, in common with other count fields in the DQ, should not be considered conclusive; for example, only 17 respondents felt confident enough to estimate the number of pupils affected by closure. This in essence means the averages of count fields are significantly higher than one would assume from the above table:

Data	Average per Respondent
Pupils at School	168
Pupils Subsidised	58
Pupils Affected by School being Downsized	120
Pupils Affected by Closure	85

The total cost of schools to farmers, just over a million dollars for our sample alone, is a significant proportion of the national education budget. (See under predictions for a further discussion of this subject).


Another significant loss to farm workers was the reduction in basic medical and health services offered by farmers.

Data	Amount
Did you provide a Clinic or Medical Care?	70%
Annual Costs of Clinic or Medical Care	\$1,004,262.00
Did you provide AIDS awareness training/teaching?	73%
Annual Costs of AIDS awareness	\$206,980.00

In the majority of cases farmers would provide a health-worker who would receive basic training in simple treatments of common medical conditions. Some farmers did provide a fully fledged clinic, and in some instances a trained nurse. HIV/AIDS awareness, which is an important means of combating the epidemic, was provided by 73% of respondents. This covers a wide variety of different activities, ranging from staged HIV theatre in education programmes to talks and demonstrations. Again, the costs that respondents report for these

activities are significant, with well over a million dollars spent by the sample on medical care and HIV/AIDS awareness.

Another of the losses that farm workers experienced were the following amenities provided by farmers. In some cases these amenities would still be available to farm workers after the farmer's eviction, but in others they would disappear.



It should be noted that surrounding communal lands were also, in some instances, dependent on the farms for some of these amenities. Generally farmers tried to maintain good relationships with the surrounding areas. They would thus allow members of the surrounding community access, for example, to the farm store and clinic.

### **Losses Experienced by the Nation**

Finally, it should be mentioned that this survey makes no attempt to survey the numerous and complex downstream economic losses caused by the politically motivated destruction of Zimbabwe's backbone industry. One must remember that agriculture was the largest client for many Zimbabwean businesses, from pesticide, fertiliser and seed companies, to legal and accountancy firms, from light engineering businesses and freight concerns to packaging and marketing houses. Many former agricultural towns are in a state of complete ruin as the business that sustained them has vanished.




## **Inferences: the Nation**

One of the guiding aims of this study has been to obtain enough data to make inferences and predictions concerning the state of all the farms throughout the country. Happily, the authors of this report are now confident enough of their findings to do so.

For the purposes of extrapolation, the country has been broken down into two zones: Zone 1, which includes Mashonaland East, Mashonaland West, Mashonaland Central and Manicaland, and Zone 2, which includes Masvingo, Midlands, Matabeleland South and Matabeleland North. It must be remembered that our sample is skewed quite heavily towards Zone 1:

	Sample Size	Total Farmers	Percentage
Zone 1	391	2963	13.2%
Zone 2	27	987	2.7%
<b>Total</b>	<b>418</b>	<b>3950</b>	<b>10.6%</b>

This bias can be seen in the following map, where the numbers represent the number of respondents from that province.



Whilst the sample is large enough to make some fairly robust inferences about the country as a whole, it is clear that the strong geographical bias in our data could seriously affect the inferences. As the bias is in favour of those provinces generally considered to have experienced more violence, this could inflate certain of our figures. For this reason, and because the project is in a much better position to make accurate predictions about Zone 1 than about Zone 2, inferences have been made for both Zone 1 and Zone 2, and then combined into a prediction for the country. All inferences of means have been made using one sample t-procedures for mean inference with 99% confidence intervals<sup>20</sup>.

<sup>20</sup> In essence, this statistical term means that 99 times out of 100 the average of the population will lie within a certain range of the average of our sample. Using this 99% confidence level has the practical effect of widening the upper and lower limits for the inferences, that is, of giving a greater ranager of possible values for the average of the population. Combined with our conservative policy of taking the lower limit as the inference and ignoring the upper limit, we believe that these inferences will stand up to scrutiny. The upper limits are given in the tables for reference, but are not discussed in the text.

If we consider the field “Were you forced to renounce your citizenship?” for example, we get the following inferences:

Inference for Zone 1				Inference for Zone 2				Inference for Country			
Percentage		Total People		Percentage		Total People		Percentage		Total People	
Min	Max	Min	Max	Min	Max	Min	Max	Min	Max	Min	Max
26%	38%	766.13	1128.37	2%	50%	20.18	491.60	20%	41%	786.31	1619.97

This table reveals several things about the field Renounce, all at the 99% confidence level. It indicates that for Zone 1 between 26% and 38% of farmers would answer that they had been forced to renounce their citizenship, i.e. between 766 and 1128 respondents. It reveals the same statistics about Zone 2, namely that we can be 99% confident that between 2% and 50% of respondents would say that they had been forced to renounce their citizenship, that is between 20 and 492 people.

As is obvious from this example, the ranges of values for Zone 2 inferences are considerably larger, so we are correspondingly less sure where the means and totals lie. This is mainly a result of our small sample size in Zone 2.

In the final section above for “Country” the averages are weighted, so that figures from Zone 1, which has a total of approximately 2963 farmers in the population, have (roughly) 75% of the weight and Zone 2, with 987 farmers, has roughly 25% of the weight. This means that the inferences given at the national level reflect not only the geographical bias of the sample, but also the geographical bias of the population. For the “Country Totals” column, the minimum is calculated by adding the minimums from both Zone 1 and Zone 2, and the maximum by adding the maximums from Zones 1 and 2.

For the purposes of this report, JAG, RAU and GAPWUZ will maintain conservative estimates and base our predictions on the minimum inferences. For fields describing Government response, such as police helpfulness, maximums will occasionally be used in order to ensure that estimates will be conservative. It is hoped that by thus erring on the side of caution any bias that may have crept into this study through the self-selection of participants or through respondent exaggeration should be minimised.

The inferences then for the country are as follows<sup>21</sup>:

## **Demographics**

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<sup>21</sup> In some cases, figures that have no common sense counterpart (e.g. totals for ages) have been removed.



Field	Age	Renounce	On farm
Mean Min	55.13	20%	3%
Mean Max	60.29	41%	18%
Total Min		786	118
Total Max		1,620	713

We can be 99% confident that the mean age of farmers is between 55 and 60 years old. This confirms that the white farmers in Zimbabwe were an ageing population. At least 20% of them were forced to renounce their citizenship, that is, a minimum of 786 people. Between 3% and 18% of farmers are still on their farms. As we know that many farmers have been evicted recently in post March 2008 election violence, the widely used figure of about 10% or 400 farmers still farming seems a reasonable maximum estimate to JAG at this date.<sup>22</sup>

Field	Know current occupier	Occupier directly involved in eviction
Mean Min	59%	61%
Mean Max	81%	82%
Total Min	2,319	2,427
Total Max	3,180	3,231

Perhaps surprisingly, at least 59% of farmers nationwide would state that they know the identity of the current occupier(s) of their farm. This suggests that any Land Audit might quite feasibly seek preliminary information about the current occupiers of the farms from the former white farmers. In addition, a high percentage, at least 61% of farmers, would claim that the occupier was directly involved in evicting the farmer.

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<sup>22</sup> August 8, 2008

Field	Employees: Full-time	Part-time	Family members	Farm Residents
Mean Min	61	52	264	329
Mean Max	87	104	381	465
Total Min	242,146	205,458	1,042,148	1,297,827
Total Max	344,931	412,712	1,505,689	1,835,787

These figures are again instructive. On average, farms across the country would employ at least 61 full-time employees and 52 seasonal casual workers. This would result in a total work force of at least 242,146 farm worker families, up to a possible maximum of 344, 931. This roughly coincides with estimates made, for example, by the FCTZ which states

*In the 1980s and 1990s, their numbers fluctuated between 300,000 and 350,000, or between 20 and 25 per cent of the national workforce. The farm workforce supported an even larger population of about 2 million. (2003, 17)*

The population numbers given by the FCTZ are also broadly replicated by this study, which gives a minimum estimate of the farm population of 1.297 million people. Comparison between the two figures shows that it is clearly unlikely that farmers are overestimating the size of their workforces.

One highly significant question that has often been overlooked in the public discourse over "land reform" is this: *did the Government's "Fast Track Land Reform Programme" resettle as many families as it displaced?*

It is possible to provide an attempt at an answer to this question. The 2003 FCTZ report quoted above states that

*In the Mashonaland provinces surveyed in the second quarter of 2002, between 33 and 50 per cent of farm workers had stayed on despite losing their jobs.*

According to the Government's own Utete Report<sup>23</sup> published in 2003, i.e. within several months of the FCTZ report, the figures for the "Fast Track Land Reform Program" were as follows:

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<sup>23</sup> REPORT OF THE PRESIDENTIAL LAND REVIEW COMMITTEE ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FAST TRACK LAND REFORM PROGRAMME, 2000-2002 ('The Utete Report'), 2003.

Field	Farms Acquired	White owned farms remaining	% of white owned farms acquired	Households resettled
Mashonaland Central	712	135	84%	14,756
Mashonaland East	912	213	81%	21,625
Mashonaland West	1,792	460	80%	32,133
Total	3,416	808	81%	68,514

Using data from this survey, we know the average number of workers employed on farms in Mashonaland (Zone 1) was at least 77 full time employees. Thus, combining FCTZ figures with the Utete Report figures, we find that by 2003, 3,416 farms were acquired by Government. It is assumed that the workers on these farms had thus lost their jobs. These 3,416 farms each employed an average of 77 workers plus their families, or a total of 263,032 households. FCTZ says that at least 50% of these workers on acquired farms were displaced , i.e. 131,516 people were displaced. However, the Utete Report says that 68,514 households were resettled. These 68,514 people who were resettled represent approximately half the people displaced. It is clear, therefore, that there was no net gain in the resettlement exercise; it displaced more people than it resettled.<sup>24</sup>

Similarly, the 2005 IMF country report on Zimbabwe<sup>25</sup> quotes the Government Central Statistical Office figures for Agricultural, Forestry and Fishing employment as follows:

No of Employees	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing	345,000	338,000	325,000	290,000	221,000	158,000	154,400

Whilst it is not certain to what extent those 170,000 workers who lost their jobs were also displaced, it is clear that a large proportion of them would have been evicted, along with their families. This should be borne in mind when inflated Government figures relating to resettled households are given.

<sup>24</sup> The calculation here includes many assumptions and should thus be considered indicative only. Vast numbers of people were displaced in this exercise, and government has not yet accounted for them.

<sup>25</sup> *Zimbabwe: Selected Issues and Statistical Appendix*, IMF Country Report No. 05/359, October 2005



## Farmer Losses

Field	Loss of moveable property (US\$)	Value of moveable and immoveable property burnt (US\$)	Value of lost livestock (US\$)	Value of lost crops (US\$)	Value of lost earnings (US\$)	Value of medical expenses (US\$)
Mean Min	\$303,450	\$32,826	\$71,848	\$87,957	\$1,111,334	\$1,077
Mean Max	\$753,825	\$524,410	\$559,585	\$521,972	\$2,780,041	\$18,689
Total Min	\$1,198,628,930	\$129,661,833	\$283,800,304	\$347,429,682	\$4,389,768,375	\$4,255,404
Total Max	\$2,977,606,810	\$2,071,417,724	\$2,210,360,000	\$2,061,790,503	\$10,981,161,756	\$73,822,991

Once again, the various fields indicate extremely large figures when inferences are made. We can expect that a minimum of \$1.2 billion of moveable property was lost nationwide as a consequence of the “Fast Track Land Reform Programme”. In addition, at least US\$130 million of property was burnt. US\$284 million was lost in the form of livestock, US\$347 million was lost in the form of crops and farmers spent on average at least US\$1000 in medical expenses as a result of trauma or physical violence. Whilst our study did not attempt to measure this, anecdotal evidence from the companion project suggests that numerous farmers have in the last eight years either died from, or become victim to, stress-related diseases such as cancer.

When lost earnings are considered, the figures are substantial. Farmers estimate that the total value of their lost earnings is at least US\$4.4 billion, or an average of at least a million dollars per farmer. As the last unrestricted farming year for many farmers was in 1999, this represents up to nine years of greatly reduced or non-existent operations. The loss to the economy has been massive.

When these individual losses are totalled, the minimum total losses across the country would amount to approximately US\$6.35 billion, a huge sum, but not altogether surprising considering that Zimbabwe's economy depended mainly on the agricultural industry.

Field	Total Losses (US\$)
Mean Min	\$1,608,492
Mean Max	\$5,158,521
Total Min	\$6,353,544,527

Total Max	\$20,376,159,784
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These estimates seem to be in the range suggested by a number of economists when considering the damage to the agricultural economy and to the economy in general. Craig Richardson has estimated that nearly US\$5 billion in wealth “vanished” from the agricultural sector between 1999 and 2000.<sup>26</sup> The figure from our study is of course calculated on a much longer time period than merely 1999 to 2000, and, although it does reflect loss of earnings, it does not reflect actual capital losses to the economy, or the knock-on effects of the losses experienced in the considerable portion of the economy, directly or indirectly associated with commercial agricultural. As Craig Richardson points out, by way of example, prior to 1997 an average of 1,600 tractors were sold annually, but this had declined to 8 in 2002. Richardson, however, estimates that total agricultural revenue, from 2000 to 2003, was about US\$1,017 million, but, using the 1999 figure as a stable estimate of revenue [which is not necessarily justified], the revenues in those years could have been in the order of US\$3,408 million had the “land reform” exercise not taken place.

Macro-economic considerations apart, it is evident that enormous losses were experienced by the commercial farming sector, and all of it was avoidable if a rational policy had been adopted in respect of land reform. Most certainly all of these losses could have been greatly minimised. Finally, the amount of the damages, for which the Zimbabwe Government should be liable, given its overt condonation of human rights violations attendant on the “Land Reform Programme”, would have catastrophic consequences for an economy already in precipitate decline.

### **Worker Losses**

Field	Provide school on farm	Pupils at school	Subsidise pupils at other school	Pupils subsidised	School downsized	Pupils affected	School closed	Pupils affected by closure
Mean Min	22%	87	28%	28	10%	4	11%	21
Mean Max	44%	232	50%	73	23%	176	25%	80
Total Min	877	76,299	1,104	30,956	388	1,432	450	9,665
Total Max	1,722	399,955	1,994	145,704	902	159,013	977	77,681

<sup>26</sup> Craig J. Richardson, “*Property Rights, Land Reforms, and the Hidden Architecture of Capitalism*”, DEVELOPMENT POLICY OUTLOOK, No. 2, 2006. American Enterprise Institute.

Losses in schooling to farm workers are significant. Farmers nationwide provided a minimum of 877 schools, which on average catered for at least 87 pupils each. This means that a minimum of 76,299 schoolchildren were at schools on the farms. In addition, farmers subsidised a minimum of 30,956 schoolchildren. However the high rate of school closures countrywide (at least 450) and schools being downsized (at least 388) as a result of farmers being evicted, means that a minimum of 11,097 pupils across the country lost schooling opportunities.

These figures are very low when compared with other sources. For example, the 2005 IMF country report on Zimbabwe citing official Zimbabwe Government statistics says that

*Close to 1 million children that attended the farm schools (almost 40 percent of the total junior school enrolment of the country) have either been relocated to less adequate education facilities in communal areas or have dropped out of school altogether. (7)*

The figure of 87 pupils per school also seems a gross underestimate by farmers. At any rate, it is clear that farm schools provided a significant contribution to national education.

Medical services to farm workers across the country were also severely disrupted by the farm invasions and evictions. The following table shows that at least 53% of farmers across the country provided either a clinic or some form of medical care. At least 59% of them provided AIDS awareness teaching or training.

Field	Clinic or medical care	AIDS awareness program
Mean	53%	59%
Min		
Mean	75%	81%
Max		
Total Min	2,101	2,317
Total Max	2,978	3,190

As the October 2005 IMF report on Zimbabwe also makes clear, these kinds of social services were often provided by farmers:

*In the past, almost every commercial farm provided or cooperated with neighbors to provide on-farm health schemes for farm workers, support for local clinics, on-farm schools or support for local area schools, on-farm*

adult education and support for HIV/AIDS orphans. As a result of the land reform program, nearly all of this social infrastructure has now collapsed.  
(7)

Financially these services were not insignificant.

Field	Annual cost of school	Annual cost of clinic or medical care	Annual cost AIDS awareness
Mean	\$1,459.43	\$1,439.41	\$246.25
Min			
Mean	\$3,910.59	\$3,550.70	\$713.60
Max			
Total Min	\$5,764,754.72	\$5,685,683.56	\$972,672.42
Total Max	\$15,446,821.07	\$14,025,272.02	\$2,818,710.25

If one considers the minimum totals against the budgets for the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare, it is obvious that the extrapolations represent significant proportions of Government expenditure.

	Ministry of Health and Child Welfare			Ministry of Education		
	ZWD	Rate <sup>27</sup>	USD	ZWD	Rate	USD
2000	\$6,189,168,000	55	\$112,530,327	\$14,610,116,500	55	\$265,638,482
2001	\$10,933,711,000	205	\$53,335,176	\$26,070,950,000	205	\$127,175,366
2002	\$22,459,863,000	890	\$25,235,801	\$50,395,134,000	890	\$56,623,746
	Sample Comparison	Min	\$6,658,356		Min	\$5,764,755
		Max	\$16,843,982		Max	\$15,446,821

This is very revealing. It shows the general reduction in services of the Government as it spiralled into economic meltdown as the result of the farm seizures and also shows that the farmers contributed significantly to social welfare, with minimums at 2000 levels equating to between 2% and 6% of the Ministry of Education budget, and between 6% and 15% of the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare's budget.

The lack of health services must inevitably have contributed to the number of workers who have died as a result of the evictions.

Field	Employees	Employees' Family members	Total
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<sup>27</sup> The Rates have been calculated using yearly average parallel market rates.



	died	died	
Mean Min	9	12	21
Mean Max	21	46	66
Total Min	34,354	48,957	83,311
Total Max	81,751	180,302	262,054

As has been commented elsewhere, the figures for the number of people who have died are believed to be gross underestimates, considering that most of the surveyed farmers have not been in contact with their workers in any significant way since they were evicted. However, we can reasonably estimate that a minimum of 83,311 farm workers have died since losing their jobs. If we consider the maximum estimate for farm residents, this means that at least 5% of farm residents have died since losing their jobs.

## **Amenity Index**

Field	Amenity Index
Mean Min	6.24
Mean Max	7.50

The average amenity index across the country would have been at least 6.24. That is, on average, workers across the country would have had at least six basic amenities. The six most common amenities provided to workers were (in order of frequency): brick houses, toilets, piped water, vegetable gardens, electricity or lights and sponsored sport. Current research on farm workers will reveal the way that these amenities were lost consequent to the farmer's eviction.

## The Courts, the Law and the Police

Field	Objected to designation	Contested in Admin Court	Conceded under duress	Forcibly evicted	Court order to continue	Number of court orders
Mean Min	87%	47%	30%	64%	13%	0.15
Mean Max	99%	69%	53%	85%	33%	0.65
Total Min	3,424	1,838	1,167	2,531	497	609
Total Max	3,906	2,743	2,078	3,341	1,288	2,550

It is hardly surprising that so many farmers, at least 87%, should have legally objected to their farm's designation. At least 47% contested this designation in the Administrative Court. At least 30% of farmers would say that they had conceded their farms under duress across the country. In some cases this might have been interpreted as conceding a portion of the farm under duress, or as an owner of multiple farms ceding one farm in order to keep another. It is highly significant that a minimum of 64% were forcibly evicted, that is at least 2,531 farmers and their families. Once again, it should be recalled that these forcible evictions were illegal, but explicitly or implicitly condoned by the State.

Relatively few farmers across the country sought court assistance to continue farming, and indeed advice given to farmers at the time explicitly cautioned against this. We can infer that a minimum of 497 farmers applied for a court order to continue operations free from interference, and these 497 farmers sought at least 609 court orders. In other words, some farmers would have obtained more than one court order. The very fact that court orders to continue farming free from interference were obtained on more than one occasion is highly damning of the ZRP's role in the land invasions.

Field	Try get police enforcement	Number of times	Successful	Try get police to stop violence	Number of times to stop violence	Were police ever helpful	Number of times helpful	Ever see police intimidated	Sympathetic police transferred
Mean Min	26%	0.77	1%	63%	2.21	20%	0.49	26%	45%
Mean Max	49%	3.03	9%	85%	5.51	42%	1.64	48%	68%
Total Min	1,024	3,023	55	2,504	8,716	779	1,937	1,034	1,772
Total	1,920	11,975	356	3,346	21,752	1,650	6,464	1,887	2,692

Max									
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When we consider their role in more detail, we find that the police have been involved in both crimes of commission, as discussed elsewhere, and also crimes of omission, as the above table makes clear. We can infer from our sample that across the country a minimum of 26% of farmers would have attempted to get the police to enforce a court order. Typically these court orders ranged from eviction orders against illegal settlers to peace orders against particular individuals. Farmers across the country would have tried at least 0.77 times on average to get the police to enforce such court orders. They would have been successful at most 9% of the time – and here we use a maximum to give the police as much credit as possible. A police force that enforces only 1 in 10 court orders is not acting in an effective and non-partisan manner.

At least 63%, or 2504 farmers, would have tried to get the police to stop violence or intimidation against themselves or their workers. They would have tried, on average, at least 2.21 times each. That is, across the country, a minimum of 8,716 attempts would have been made by farmers to get police to stop violence or intimidation. However, the police would have assisted a maximum of 42% of farmers, and this a maximum of 1.64 times per farmer. Of the minimum of 8,716 attempts to get police involvement on their farms, farmers would report that in 1,937 of these instances the police were helpful. That is, roughly, one time out of four that the country's police force was prepared to assist by stopping violence and intimidation. That fact that one could only rely on the protection of the police on one occasion in four provides further evidence that the police were under orders not to get involved on the farms, giving war veterans, ZANU PF supporters and youth militia an effective free hand, which was subsequently backed up by political amnesty. This amnesty effectively created a legal defence that one's actions were "politically motivated" in order to escape punishment.

In addition, even crimes clearly unrelated to political violence on the farms were ignored by the police. Poaching, stock theft and even petty theft would receive minimal police response. It seemed to farmers that the police had received orders to stay well clear of the farms, whatever the nature of the crime committed. In the rare instances where perpetrators of crimes were arrested, they would often be released without appearing in court.

It is also significant that a minimum of 26% of farmers across the country would have seen the police themselves being intimidated. Even where individual officers refused to be co-opted into the State arsenal to attack farmers and their workers, those officers would have been under enormous pressure to turn a blind

eye towards crime on the farms. Indeed, 45% of farmers report that “sympathetic or professional” policemen were transferred or removed from their duties.

## **Violations**

The inferences for the various violations across the country were derived using a slightly more complex methodology than was used for the other fields. It will be recalled that the questions asked about violations consisted of two parts: 1) a binary field: did a particular violation occur, and 2) if so, a count field: how many people were affected. As we have discussed elsewhere, respondents often said that a particular violation had occurred but would not go on to estimate the number of victims of this violation. This seems reasonable considering, for example, that whilst a farmer may know that some of his workers were assaulted, and would thus answer ‘yes’ to the binary field, he would quite possibly not know the exact number of victims of these assaults. In fact, the example quoted above shows that 259 of the 418 respondents answered yes to the question “Did your workers or their families get assaulted?”, but of those 259 only 109 felt confident enough to estimate the exact number of their workers who had been assaulted. It is clear, by totalling up the numbers given by the 109, that we are not particularly close to getting an accurate picture of the number of assaults; it is only when we consider counts and binaries in combination that we are able to do this.

Therefore, extrapolations have been made here for both binaries and counts, and then these have been combined to obtain a more accurate estimate of numbers of violations. For example, using the field of Workers’ Assault, we get the following inferences:

Field	Zone 1		Zone 2		Total	
	Min	Max	Min	Max	Min	Max
Binary: Assault Workers	57%	70%	14%	68%	46%	69%
Count: Assault Workers	24,391	101,127	0	33,722	24,391	134,850
Total	13,931	70,526	0	22,768	13,931	93,295

When one makes inferences for the binary field (Binary: Assault Workers) and arrives at results for Zones 1 and 2, these results give the percentage of farmers in those Zones who would answer yes to the question “Were your workers assaulted?”. When one makes inferences for the count field (Count: Assault Workers), these inferences give you the total number of workers assaulted in that Zone if *all* respondents answered it positively<sup>28</sup>. Here, the inference is that between 24,391 and 134,850 workers were assaulted across the country, *if* all respondents reported assaults. However, we know that between 46% and 69% of respondents report assaults against their workers. Therefore, to arrive at a sensible interpretation of the results, and to avoid exaggeration, the two fields should be multiplied.

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<sup>28</sup> Null values are not counted in the statistics, and thus the calculation assumes that all respondents have answered this positively; this is not the case.

Putting questions of methodology aside, let us consider the inferences for violations:

Field	Farmer + Family		Employees + Families		TOTAL	
	Min	Max	Min	Max	Min	Max
Abduction or kidnapping	161	582	311	13,374	472	13,956
Assault	986	4,053	13,931	93,295	14,917	97,348
Death threats	3,698	56,035	25,035	132,629	28,733	188,664
Deliberate killing of wildlife	0	113,191	0	0	0	113,191
Denied food relief if not member of ZANU PF	0	0	92,768	422,510	92,768	422,510
Disappearance	0	18,173	16	4,389	16	22,562
Displacement	0	0	249,428	591,805	249,428	591,085
Forced to attend political meetings	2,352	6,539	226,492	762,149	228,844	768,688
Forced to join or contribute to ZANU PF	2,359	6,058	216,883	567,009	219,242	573,067
Pet animals killed or maimed	462	6,161	0	0	462	6,161
Held hostage	2,554	5,071	1,129	41,987	3,683	47,058
Murder	0	813	0	932	0	1,745
Political intimidation	5,810	80,946	255,761	586,623	261,571	667,569
Rape	0	0	165	1,543	165	1,543
Intimidation of foremen	0	0	7,580	43,363	7,580	43,363
Torture	0	3,014	4,525	57,970	4,525	60,984
Unlawful arrest	519	2,421	788	22,904	1,307	25,325
Unlawful detention	89	1,227	239	25,892	328	27,119
Children forced to join ZANU PF	0	0	40,270	582,756	40,270	582,756
<b>Violation Total</b>	<b>29,003</b>	<b>325,920</b>	<b>1,135,321</b>	<b>3,951,129</b>	<b>1,164,324</b>	<b>4,277,049</b>

The figures are sobering and require careful study. At least 92,768 people were denied food relief because they did not belong to ZANU PF. In the course of this violence, a minimum of 228,844 people were forced to attend political meetings. 219,242 people were forced to join or contribute to ZANU PF. Across the country, 261,571 people would be described as having undergone political intimidation. The children of farm workers across the country were forced to join ZANU PF in huge numbers: at least 40,270.

It should be remembered that many of these violations (which are recorded in the surveys as “number of people affected” and not the “number of times” they

occurred) were repeated on numerous occasions and this data has not been captured in the survey. What is reported here is the number of victims; the majority of victims would have been victimised many times. Political violations, for example, were almost continuous, with political intimidation and forced attendance at rallies and all night *pungwes* an inescapable and regular occurrence.

At least 14,917 people across the country were assaulted. There would have been at least 165 rapes. More than 4,525 people were tortured. During the process farmers had 462 pets killed or maimed to intimidate them to leave their farms. Whilst we do not yet have enough evidence to infer with confidence the figures for murder, it is nonetheless evident that considerable numbers of people were murdered. (In our sample we recorded the murders of 14 farmers or their family members and 27 employees or their family members; that is a total of 41 murders from our sample of 418 farmers.) More than 28,733 people were issued with death threats, no small psychological trauma considering the environment. 3,683 people were held hostage, the majority being farmers and their families, in an attempt to intimidate them into leaving their farms.

A minimum of 249,428 people were displaced as a result of the State's actions – a sizeable population considering the purported goals of the “Land Reform” programme. As discussed above, this appears to completely undermine the Government's (presumably inflated) figures of resettled households. A minimum of 16 people disappeared. A minimum of 472 people have been abducted or kidnapped in the process of “Land Reform”. On the 4000 odd farms 7,580 foremen would have been intimidated because of their position of authority. The police arrested 1,307 people unlawfully, and illegally detained a further 328 people.

All in all, a minimum of 1,164,234 violations would be counted. The presence of any single one of these million violations should be a cause for concern, but in such large numbers the figures demonstrate how appallingly widespread and systematic the State's attack on the Zimbabwean people has been, through acts of commission and omission.

It is this that leads the authors of this report to consider the Zimbabwean Government guilty of Crimes Against Humanity.


Finally, it is worth considering once again the proportion of these violations perpetrated against farmers. Of the total minimum 1,164,324 violations estimated for the country, only 29,003 are estimated to have been perpetrated against farmers. This amounts to only 2.5% of all violations. It is clear that 97.5% of



the violations were perpetrated against farm workers. This fact is not mentioned in the Government's rhetoric of righting colonial injustices.

## Geographical Prediction of Violence

Whilst it is interesting to make inferences for the population as a whole, it is important to have some idea about the geographical spread of this violence. Below is a heat map showing the intensity of violence across the country, where a darker colour indicates a more violent area. The somewhat complex methodology for this is described in Appendix 2. The blackest areas on this map represent a Violent Violation Index of about 3, which means that three of the



following violations are recorded: Assault, Murder, Rape, or Torture of Farmer or Farm Worker.

The map demonstrates a number of hot spots, or areas where violent violations occur more frequently. Clearly visible in the north-west is the Karoi area, from where a sizeable proportion of our sample came. Karoi was noted for being a violent and volatile area, to some degree because of the appointment of a notorious policeman, Inspector Mabunda, to the position of Member-in-Charge in 2000. Also visible are the dark areas of Marondera/Wedza and Macheke/Virginia. Another dark area of the map is Chegutu, where Mike and

Angela Campbell's Mt Carmel Farm is situated. Recently the Campbells and their son-in-law, Ben Freeth, were severely assaulted in retaliation for their attempts to legally challenge the Government of Zimbabwe in the SADC Tribunal over the legality and constitutionality of the land invasions.

Also noticeable are the lighter greys across the country, and surprisingly, to the north east of Harare in the Mazowe valley. Whilst farmers from Mazowe reported a large number and many different kinds of violations, they reported relatively few of the most serious violent violations.

## **Conclusion**

The findings of this study illustrate a widespread and systematic series of violations against the Zimbabwean people. These were conducted by officers and agents of the State in some instances, and in all others were condoned implicitly or explicitly by the State. At least a million violations are estimated to have occurred across the country, with the majority of these being political violations aimed at stamping out nascent MDC support and reinforcing traditional ZANU PF hegemony. Estimates for the levels of political violence, however, are also very high. The fact that a minimum of 4,525 people have been tortured in the course of what purported to be a socially just “Land Reform” programme is fundamentally at odds with State rhetoric on the matter. The Zimbabwean Government is liable for the vast losses sustained by farmers and workers consequent on their evictions. For Zimbabwe to move forward socially, politically or economically, it is patent that the issues discussed in this report must be addressed. Only then can any meaningful healing take place. For this reason the demands of JAG and GAPWUZ are as follows:

- i. A return to the Rule of Law in Zimbabwe
- ii. Respect for property rights in Zimbabwe
- iii. Respect for human rights in Zimbabwe
- iv. The non-selective application of justice for all Zimbabwean citizens
- v. Just and equitable tenure of land for all Zimbabwean citizens
- vi. Full and fair compensation/restitution for all those adversely affected by the so-called “Land Reform” Programme
- vii. A governmental system that is inclusive, accountable, honest and transparent
- viii. The return of Zimbabwe to food and foreign currency self-sufficiency
- ix. The promotion of national unity in Zimbabwe's agricultural sector in order to resurrect Zimbabwe's agricultural industry.

## **Appendix 1**

### **Sample of Damages Questionnaire used in this survey**

Date:	
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Name:	
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Age:	
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Nationality:	
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	YES	NO
Were you forced to renounce your previous Zimbabwe citizenship?		

Name of farm:	
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Province:	
District	

	YES	NO
Are you still living on the farm?		

What number of full-time employees did you have?	
What number of part-time employees did you have?	
What number of employees family members lived on the farm?	

	YES	NO
Do you know who currently occupies your farm?		
Was this person directly involved in any actions involved in taking over your farm or in evicting you?		

#### 1. Personal:

##### 1.1 Have you or any of your family experienced any of the following?

	YES	No of people affected
Murder		
Assault		
Torture		
Rape		
Unlawful arrest [arrest without a charge]		
Unlawful detention [detention longer than 48 hours]		
Abduction or kidnapping		
Death threats		
Forced attendance at political meetings		
Political intimidation		
Held hostage		
Forced to join Zanu(PF) or make contributions to Zanu(PF)		
Had pet animals killed or maimed		
Deliberate killing or maiming of wildlife		

2.1 *Perpetrators:*

Where any of the following involved in the above?

	YES	No of people involved
Police		
Uniformed Branch		
Riot Squad		
Support Unit		
CID		
PISI		
Army		
CIO		
War Veteran		
Youth Militia		
Zanu(PF) member		
Farm employee		
Member of Parliament		
Provincial Governor		
Provincial Administrator		
District Administrator		
Member of President's Office		
Other [specify]		

2. Workers:

2.1 *Have any of your employees or their families experienced any of the following?*

	YES	No of people affected
Murder		
Assault		
Torture		
Rape		
Unlawful arrest [arrest without a charge]		
Unlawful detention [detention longer than 48 hours]		
Abduction or kidnapping		
Death threats		
Forced attendance at political meetings		
Political intimidation		
Held hostage		
Forced to join Zanu(PF) or make contributions to Zanu(PF)		
Young persons forced to join Zanu(PF) Youth		
Denied food relief if not member of Zanu(PF)		
Specific intimidation of workers in authority on the farm		

2.2. *Perpetrators:*

	YES	No of people

		involved
Police		
Uniformed Branch		
Riot Squad		
Support Unit		
CID		
PISI		
Army		
CIO		
War Veteran		
Youth Militia		
Zanu(PF) member		
Farm employee		
Member of Parliament		
Provincial Governor		
Provincial Administrator		
District Administrator		
Member of President's Office		
Other[specify]		

3. Legal actions:

	YES	NO
Did you object to the designation of your farm?		
Did you contest your designation in the Administrative court?		

Date that legal challenge made	
--------------------------------	--

	YES	NO
Did you acquiesce or concede under duress to the acquisition of part or the whole of your farm?		
Were you forcibly evicted from your farm?		

	YES	NO
Did you ever obtain a court order to continue using your farm free from interference?		
Date of court order(s)		
Number of court order(s)		
How much in US\$ have you spent on legal fees and lawyers?		

	YES	NO
Did you ever try to get the police to enforce a court order?		
Number of times		
	YES	NO
Was it successful?		

	YES	NO
Did you ever try to get the police to stop violence or intimidation against yourself or your workers?		
Number of times		
	YES	NO
Were the police ever helpful?		
Number of times		

	YES	NO
Did you ever see the police intimidated themselves?		
Were sympathetic or professional policemen transferred away or removed from duties?		

#### 4. Damages suffered:

##### 4.1 Farm owner:

<i>Loss of property</i>	<i>Value in US\$</i>
Estimate in US\$ the value of all moveable property stolen, or damaged beyond repair by illegal actions. Include forced sales due to extortion.	

<i>Loss of property from burnings</i>	<i>Value in US\$</i>
Estimate in US\$ the value of all immovable and moveable property burned completely or damaged beyond repair by illegal actions.	

<i>Loss of livestock</i>	<i>Value in US\$</i>
Estimate in US\$ the value of all livestock stolen or killed illegally.	

<i>Crops</i>	<i>Value in US\$</i>
Estimate in US\$ the value of all crops stolen or destroyed.	

<i>Loss of earnings</i>	<i>Value in US\$</i>
Estimate in US\$ the amount of total income lost in the time that you have been unable to conduct normal farming operations.	

NOTE: This should be purely *profits after tax* and should be based on the last full and unaffected farming year. It should also include anticipated increases in profits were you able to have continued farming.

<i>Costs of medical treatment</i>	<i>Value in US\$</i>
Estimate in US\$ the amount of medical expenses incurred by your family or your workers from injuries due to violence.	

##### 4.2 Farm workers:

	YES	Number
Were any of your employees forced to renounce their citizenship?		



<i>Redundancy pay</i>	<i>Value in US\$</i>
How much in US\$ did you pay out to your former employees when you had to leave your farm?	

<i>Wages lost</i>	<i>Value in US\$</i>
Estimate the total amount of wages in US\$ that your full-time and part-time employees have lost since you had to discontinue farming.	

Note: This should be based on the last full farming year.

	YES	NO
Did your employees lose their homes due to illegal destruction or burning?		
Did your employees lose property due to theft or extortion?		

<i>Social amenities Lost</i>	YES	NO
Did you provide any of the following for your workers?		
Solid structure housing [brick]		
Toilet facilities		
Piped water		
Electricity and/or lights		
Vegetable gardens		
Farm store		
Creche		
Orphanage or orphan care		
Adult education		
Sponsored sport		

<i>Social benefits Lost</i>	YES	NO	<i>How many pupils?</i>
Did you provide a school on your farm?			
Did you subsidise children attending another school if you had no school on your farm?			
<i>Social Benefits Lost</i>	YES	<i>How much in US\$ did the school cost per year?</i>	
Did you have a school on your farm?			
<i>Social Benefits Lost</i>	YES	<i>How much in US\$ did the clinic &amp; medical cost per year?</i>	
Did you have a clinic & medical care on your farm?			
		<i>How much in US\$ did this cost per year?</i>	
Did you provide AIDS awareness training/teaching on your farm?			
<i>Deaths</i>	<i>Number died</i>		
Do you know how many of your former employees have			

died since losing their jobs on the farm?	
Do you know how many direct family members of your former employees have died since losing their jobs on the farm?	

## **Appendix 2**

### **Methodology for the production of the heat map**

The heat map was constructed in 3 steps:

- 1) calculation of violent violation index (VVI)
- 2) assessing spatial auto-correlation
- 3) kriging.

The VVI or Violent Violation Index was calculated by adding the following binary fields: Assault, Rape, Murder, Torture for both farmers and workers. This gave a score ranging from 0 to 8, with 8 representing the presence of all of those violent violations. This field was calculated for all of the farms in the GIS database.

Following this step a test for auto-correlation was run, using ArcMap's Morans I test for spatial auto-correlation. This resulted in a z-score of over 2, i.e. it was less than 5% likely that the spatial pattern made by the VVI was the result of random chance. It displayed considerable clustering of high and low values. It should be remembered that this is essentially a technical way of assessing statements of the type "Karoi was a bad area" or "Manicaland was much less violent". This assumption that particular geographical areas reflect associated levels of violence is confirmed by the results of the Morans I test. One can assume several factors causing this effect. Firstly, state structures are organised geographically, be it in Provincial or Regional Administrative structures, or even in the hierarchy of police stations in particular areas. Within each division particular individuals with responsibility were more or less efficient and more or less ruthless in the ways they carried out their duties. Secondly, individual war veterans were stationed on bases on particular farms, and ranged across a wider geographical area. This meant that one particularly violent individual could cause violence in a much wider area than just the farm on which he or she was resident.

The positive result for spatial auto-correlation meant that it was possible to proceed with Kriging. Kriging is a geostatistical technique which infers the level of a variable in places where samples have not been taken. It works on the simple geographical principle that things which are close together are more likely to be similar than things which are further apart (e.g. elevation: the spot a metre away from you is the same elevation as the one where you are sitting; however 30 metres away is more likely to be a different height). After testing several models, the one displayed was arrived at. A more detailed technical report is planned as a follow-up to this one to provide a thorough discussion of techniques like kriging.