Reforming land reform
http://www.theindependent.co.zw/
Thursday, 21 July 2011 19:13
MORE than two decades after the enactment of the Land Acquisition Act, and
commencement of its implementation 10 years later, Zimbabwe’s land reform
programme continues to be a major disaster. Whilst it cannot be credibly
argued that land reform was not very necessary and was grievously long
overdue, nevertheless the way that Zimbabwe sought to achieve that
critically needed reform was, and continues to be catastrophic, and a
principal trigger of the economic morass that has afflicted Zimbabwe and its
people.
It was incomprehensible and untenably unjust that for more than half a
century, indigenous Zimbabweans were barred by the evil Land Apportionment
Act from possessing land. They were unable to engage in the very foundation
of the economy, being agriculture, save for farming on communal lands and as
labour on non-indigenously owned farms. The policies that prevailed under
non-indigenous domination were oppressive and unjust in the extreme and
needed to be radically and constructively reformed although tragically, that
reform was not only disastrously belated, but also very substantially
ineffective.
As a result, agriculture was subjected to an avalanche of decline. As
against being the source of food for all the country’s people, and an
exporter of much produce to neighbouring states (to such extent that it was
known as the region’s breadbasket), crops diminished such that Zimbabwe
became intensively dependent upon international food aid, and upon imports
which it could not readily fund. More than 300 000 farm labourers became
unemployed, and the average number of their dependants being six, almost two
million were tragically impoverished. Foreign exchange resources diminished
to a large extent as the export tobacco crop decreased over an eight year
period, from 237 million kgs in 2001 to less than 50 million kgs in 2008.
Agriculture’s downstream economy was negatively impacted, through the loss
of spending by farmers and their labour. The entire economy contracted
exponentially.
The need to address the land ownership inequalities was recognised at the
pre-Independence Lancaster House negotiations in 1979, to the extent that
Britain, the former colonial power, pledged to make significant funding
available for indigenous land acquisition. That acquisition was to be on a
“willing buyer, willing seller” basis, and over the first five years of
Independence Britain honoured that commitment, disbursing substantial
amounts to fund the first phases of indigenous land ownership. The next
step towards land reform was that farms could not be sold, and ownership
transferred, without the transacting parties first obtaining from government
a “certificate of no interest”, which constituted governmental consent to
the sales. Progressively, there was increasing indigenous ownership,
although not to a very major extent, as most of the populace could not fund
land acquisitions. Agriculture continued to thrive and to be the country’s
economic mainstay.
But then government went berserk. Driven substantially by endemic racial
hatred, desires of self-enrichment, hatred of the former colonialists, and
perceived entrenchment of voter support, it embarked upon the devastating
pursuit of vesting ownership of all rural lands in the state, and
acquisition of millions and millions of hectares of farm land, embarking on
much ill-considered and indiscriminate redistribution. And it did so
without any payment of compensation, contending that any compensation for
land had to be paid by Britain. Although government undertook to compensate
for improvements and movables on the land, more than 10 years later, it has
failed to do so.
If agriculture is to be restored to its former glory, and if Zimbabwe is to
enjoy comprehensive economic recovery, it is of extreme urgency that the
ill-conceived and grossly mismanaged land reform programme be revamped.
That reformation does not mean a recission, but a restructuring, to be
economically effective, just and morally correct. Distressingly, the Medium
Term Policy for Zimbabwe’s economy does not address the essentially needed
reforms.
Key elements of the required reforms to regain total agricultural viability
are:
Ideally, absolute ownership of the lands must vest in the farmers, and not
in the state, and therefore title deeds must be reintroduced. Without
ownership, the farmers have no collateral with which to secure the funding
needed as working capital, and for development and acquisition of essential
equipment. Without access to adequate funds, the farmer has no prospects of
achieving viable operations. If (given its ill-conceived, fixative
attitude), the reinstatement of title deeds is reprehensibly abhorrent to
government, then the compromise, although not ideal, would be for the
current 99 year leases to be readily transferrable. Currently, leases have
no collateral value for not only are they incapable of cession, but in
addition, the 99 year tenure is hypothetical, for the state has the power to
terminate the leases on three months’ notice.
Land ownership or lease should not be racially-based but be available to any
and all Zimbabweans, irrespective of race, and be conditional only upon the
meritorious and productive usage of the land. Linked to this reform,
formerly productive non-indigenous farmers should be accorded opportunities
of resuming farming operations, thereby not only enhancing the extent of
agricultural production, but also according new farmers access to the
long-developed skills and experience of those farmers.
Full compensation needs to be given to those who lost their farms. That
compensation must be for the land and all that was thereon when the farms
were expropriated by the state. Government should not, and cannot, abdicate
its responsibility for that compensation, deviously and without foundation
seeking to attribute liability to the United Kingdom. Britain honoured its
Lancaster House obligations, and it was the Zimbabwean government that
disentitled the legitimate landowners (many of whom had had governmental
acquisition consent by way of the certificates of no interest). Of especial
urgency is where there is compensatory obligation in terms of the numerous
Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreements, which Zimbabwe has
consistently flouted. That default is one of the greatest deterrents to
Foreign Direct Investment, which investment is a major key need for
Zimbabwean economic recovery.
Agricultural policies must be conducive to the viability of the sector.
Parastatals such as the Grain Marketing Board and Cold Storage Company must
timeously pay fair, market-related prices for produce, and agriculturally
counterproductive policies should not be pursued.
If government could at least recognise the error of its ways, have the
maturity to reverse them, and put national interests ahead of its own, in
time agriculture will again thrive, and be the mainstay of the
economy. -Eric Bloch