Zimbabwean farmers and Nigerian Agriculture (1)
http://www.independentngonline.com Nigeria
Wed Jan, 19 2011
By Abdul Raufu Mustapha
Agriculture in colonial Nigeria was dominated by smallholder peasants.
Though this sector was the motor for the economy, very little was done to
improve peasant productivity. Efforts by Nigerian governments in the 1950s
and 1960s to bring ‘development’ to rural areas through the establishment of
agricultural settlements, cooperatives, and farming schools did not impact
greatly on peasant productivity. Instead, the marketing board system was
used to transfer peasant resources to the state. From 1970, public finance
was increasingly based on returns from petroleum. The mid-1970s saw
concerted efforts by Nigerian governments to invest in improved agricultural
productivity. Irrigation projects, river basin development projects,
agricultural development schemes took centre stage in state intervention in
agriculture. These schemes failed to modernize peasant agriculture. The
Zimbabwean farmers arrived in Nigeria against the background of the previous
failure to modernize agriculture and the turn to the private sector.
From 2000 the Zimbabwean government embarked on fast-track land occupations.
By 2002 the vast majority of the 4500 white commercial farmers were forced
off the land. Some of these white Zimbabwean farmers turned up in Shonga, in
Kwara State of Nigeria. There has been a torrent of journalistic accounts
on the success of the Zimbabwean farmers in transplanting commercial
agriculture to Nigeria. Under titles like ‘White Zimbabweans Bring Change to
Nigeria’, ‘White Zimbabwean farmers highlight Nigeria’s agricultural
failures’, and ‘White farmers from Zimbabwe bring prosperity to Nigeria’.
The impression is created of a massive transformation based on the ingenuity
of the Zimbabwean farmers and without any support from Nigerian governments.
But is this really so?
The terms of the MOU which the Kwara State government signed with the
Zimbabwean farmers, and developments surrounding the establishment of the
farms, paint a different picture. It committed the State government to the
provision of a series of services crucial for the development of the
commercial farms. Crucially, it committed the government to provide land.
The government undertook to clear choice land of the indigenous users right
next to the River Niger. 1289 local farmers in 28 communities were uprooted
from their farms to make way for the Zimbabwean farmers. The state set aside
a total of N77m (US$513,333) as compensation for the displaced local
farmers. Each of the initial 13 Zimbabwean farmers received a 25-year lease
of 1000 hectares. The state’s instrumentalist use of compensation and
‘agricultural packages’ (bicycles -720 were distributed – , fertilizers,
seed etc.) and the provision of long sought after communal infrastructure
like electricity and additional classrooms in local schools helped to defuse
local protests. Still, in 2009, local leaders of Governor Saraki’s Peoples’
Democratic Party complained that ‘people were paid meager sum of money for
the seizure of their land. …This is very unfair and we are just keeping
quiet because we cannot fight the government.’
The MOU also stipulated that the government must provide sundry facilities
and amenities for the Zimbabwean farmers. The government invested over N400
million (US$2.6m) on roads, housing and electricity. 600 kilometers of farm
roads, 16 electricity transformers for the grid, and many bore holes were
provided. Each farmer received a bungalow of up to 2,500 square feet,
complete with a generator, storage sheds, and fencing for farmland. N870
million [US$5.8m] was spent on irrigation by the Federal government while N1
billion [US$6.6m] was provided for electrification.
The MOU stipulated that the Zimbabwean farms should get 90% of their labour
from the local community. According to a Nigerian journalist who visited
Shonga in 2006, the local community viewed ‘the payment of N250 (US$1.7)
daily to their brethren who work on the white farms, without any other
additional benefits, as enslavement’. In 2009, local employees working on
the farms complained to the State government about poor wages and conditions
and the paternalistic attitude of some of the Zimbabwean farmers. The State
government mobilized the Ministry of Agriculture, Ministry of Labour, and
the Emir of Shonga to restore peace. Shonga Farms currently employ 315
permanent Nigerian staff, 35 expatriates, and about 6000 seasonal workers.
•Culled from the West Africa Insight Newsletter, A publication of the Centre
for Democracy and Development
Zimbabwean Farmers & Nigerian Agriculture (2)
http://www.independentngonline.com/ Nigeria
Thu Jan, 20 2011
By Abdul Raufu Mustapha
Though the Zimbabweans were originally classified as ‘investors’, the MOU
committed the Kwara State government to providing finance directly to the
Zimbabwean farms and to helping the farmers access other private sources of
funds. On this point, the MOU stipulates that the government shall provide
each of the investors ‘the sum of US$250,000 and also provide a guarantee
for a private sector loan in the sum of US250,000 to each farmer… The state
loan shall be interest free …’ The loan is to be repaid between the third
and fifth years of operation. The government is reported to have given the
Zimbabwean farmers a total of US$8.25 million in cash. Furthermore, at
Governor Saraki’s behest, the State House of Assembly passed a resolution on
5th March 2006 guaranteeing loans of US$5 million taken by the Zimbabwean
farmers from the Nigerian Agricultural, Cooperative and Rural Development
Bank. By 2009, however, only 19 percent of the loan had been repaid and ‘the
farmers said they could no longer pay’. The bank manager noted that ordinary
Nigerian farmers were looking to borrow the equivalent of just US$1225
without success, yet both the Zimbabwean farmers and their Kwara State
sponsor were refusing to meet their financial obligations to the bank. The
Kwara government is still repaying this loan.
The only obligation placed by the MOU on the farmers was the incorporation
of their companies with a share capital of US$80,000. The Zimbabwean farmers
were also to contribute to a Community Trust Fund, set up as a corporate
social responsibility project, with the companies contributing 1% of gross
turnover to the fund which is tasked with providing social infrastructure to
the local communities. There is also the Commercial Farming Institute in
Shonga, ‘a government-funded training centre, where Zimbabwean farmers will
teach … largely-subsistence farmers the techniques of modern mass-scale
farming. However, the MOU only obliged the Zimbabwean farmers to teach on
the farm ‘from time to time, but no less than once in a month’. The
Commercial Farming Institute also ran the Shonga back-to-farm programme,
focused on modern graduate farmers; by 2009, 200 graduates had been trained
and given loans ofN850,000 [US$5666] and five hectares each. The State’s
Agricultural Training School at Malete – another graduate-farmer scheme – is
said to benefit from Shonga Farms expertise.
Outside of specific MOU stipulations, there is also massive high-level
political support for the Zimbabwean farmers: ‘the governor remains
personally involved in the project, visiting the farmers in their homes,
taking their calls on his mobile phone and personally stepping in to help …’
The cargo terminal at Ilorin airport was upgraded at Kwara State expense.
Inevitably, given the level of disruption of the local communities from
outside, tensions arose, creating a difficult security situation – another
problem stoutly tackled by the State government.
As the development at Shonga proceeded and in order to access credit and
other resources, the farmers were obliged to club together and form a
consortium with the Kwara State government: Kwa-Zimbo Enterprises Ltd. As
credit dried out from Nigerian banks, Governor Saraki stepped in to sort
things out. In 2008 he tapped into his political and business networks to
pull in investors and funds for the Zimbabwean farmers. A consortium of 5
leading Nigerian banks invested N1 billion [US$6.6m] as equity in the farms
and advanced another N1billion as loans. As a result, Kwa-Zimbo Enterprises
Ltd was transformed into Shonga Farms Ltd. Shonga Farms Holdings is
described as a ‘special purpose vehicle’ to facilitate the involvement of
the banks in the farms. It owns 60 percent of Shonga Farms Ltd., with the
Zimbabwean farmers holding 40 percent. Shonga Farms Holdings itself is 75
percent owned by the 5 banks, with the Kwara State government having the
remaining 25 percent. In effect, the banks own 45 percent of the farms, the
Zimbabwean farmers own 40 percent, and the State government owns 15 percent.
Increasingly, Nigerian governments are turning to the promotion of foreign
and indigenous commercial agriculture under public private partnership
arrangements such as the one in Shonga. While this might be good for
improved agricultural productivity, we are still left with two key
questions: is this pattern of agricultural investment any more sustainable
than the failed state-led pattern of the 1970s? Secondly, what will happen
to the bulk of the peasantry left outside the main thrust of government
policy?
•Culled from the West Africa Insight Newsletter, A publication of the Centre
for Democracy and Development