No Earth Shattering Changes To Draft Constitution: Crisis In Zimbabwe Coalition
Harare, January 19, 2013 – Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition says there have been
no earth shattering changes to the draft constitution finalised by the
principals to the Global Political Agreement (GPA) on Thursday.
The organisation said this after meeting the Constitution Parliamentary
Select Committee (COPAC) co-chairperson Douglas Mwonzora of the mainstream
Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) on Friday.
The following is a full statement issued by Crisis Coalition Zimbabwe after
the meeting with Mwonzora entitled “How the constitution strings were
finally tied together:
Crisis in Zimbabwe Coalition met COPAC co-chairperson, Hon. Douglas
Mwonzora, who revealed the full details of the agreement reached to finalize
the COPAC Draft constitution at the Crisis Offices on Friday, January 18,
2013.
The meeting was attended by the Crisis Coalition Director McDonald Lewaneka
and Programs Manager Nixon Nyikadzino. Hon. Mwonzora apprised the Coalition’s
Officers on the agreement reached on the 7 key deadlock issues. The
agreements are contained in a signed Drafting Instruction which has been
given to the drafters who, the Co-Chair said, are now in the process of
finalizing the draft constitution. Hon. Mwonzora informed the meeting that
they expected the final version of the draft constitution to be out in a
week, and latest by end of January 2013, ready for presentation to
Parliament in February, with possibilities of a Referendum on the Draft
Constitution in April.
After the meeting, the interim assessment of the Coalition is that there
seems to have been no earth shuttering changes to the July 18 draft, and
that most accommodations made, were unfortunately accommodations meant to
allays political party fears rather than address the peoples aspirations.
The process, only has meaningful credence in as far as it allowed the out
puts of some fairly democratic discussions at the 2nd All Stakeholders
Conference to be discussed and incorporated into the final draft, albeit
with Politicians and Political party leaders as the final arbiters on the
matters.
The COPAC co-chair shared the following as the final agreements on the
deadlock issues (paraphrased), with the Coalitions interim comments where it
was felt necessary. Extensive comments will be sought from the Coalitions
members and Experts and released in due course.
1. Devolution:
All Clauses on devolution will be as in the COPAC draft constitution
released on July 18, 2012, with the changes being the following:
A preamble to explain what devolution does not incorporate or imply.
The office of Governor has been done away with to be replaced by a Head
of Provincial Council, who will be elected by the full council from the list
provided by a party with the majority in the council.
Comments
The provisions on devolution while short of what would have been ideal, are
welcome as a good platform to build on for the future. Better than other
more abstract concepts, which had been placed on the table like Delegation
and Decentralization. The absence of direct democracy in most of how this
devolved state is going to be put up, and the absence of a Provincial
Government still means that there are gaps, that were created as a result of
the compromises, but gaps, which may be lived with.
2. National Prosecuting Authority
There will be an Attorney General and a National Prosecuting Authority as in
the COPAC draft. The change is that the transitional provision will work for
six years instead of the previously proposed seven years.
Comments
The separation of these two functions is a welcome development. The only rub
here, has to do not with the provision but with personalities involved in
the offices during the Transitional period. The assumption, one would guess
is that the Current Attorney General will take up one of the office,
possibly the NPA leadership for the transitional period. Given reservations
around the partiality of the current office bearer this leaves a foul taste
in the mouth. However, the provision introduces a limit to the term of the
office bearer, which was not the case before.
3. National Peace and Reconciliation Commission
There will be a constitutional body for 10 years after which an Act of
Parliament may decide to perpetuate it. The difference is that the provision
in the draft Constitution of 18 July 2012 used the word “shall” instead of
“may.”, and the period for the existence of the constitutional body had been
shorter.
4. Executive Authority
Executive authority will be vested in the President and he/she will exercise
it through Cabinet. The COPAC draft said the executive authority will be
vested in both President and Cabinet.
5. Land Commission
The commission will be an executive body which will be under the Minister
responsible for Lands, but in order to avoid executive arm twisting the
commissioners will have security of tenure. The commission will be empowered
to carry out the Land Audit to ensure the “one person one farm principle.”
Comments
In spite of the safeguards put in place, the commission would still have
been better off as an independent Constitutional Commission. The compromise
made is reflective not of best practice but the fears of some parties to the
state at the moment.
6. Running mate
The running mate provision will remain the same, but will be coupled with a
transitional provision that ensures that it will not be immediately
implemented, but will come into effect after five years.
Comments
The transitional provisions are a “get out of jail free card” for the
current political leaders, who will not have to deal with the messy issues
of succession in their parties at this stage in full view of the country’s
citizens.
7. Constitutional Court
The constitutional court will remain part of the constitution and there will
be a transitional provision to have the Chief Justice Four Supreme Court and
three new judges sitting on the court for seven years.
Comments
The transitional arrangements here are also reflective of fears rather than
best practice. The inclusion of this court in the constitution would have
offered an opportunity for a fresh start with independent judges. Part of
the challenge of this provision will be the absence of a meaningful vetting
exercise that is backward looking to ensure that Judges to this court have
not been complicit in bastardising the constitution or engaged in some
dishonorable conduct while on the bench in the previous dispensation. The
absence of this vetting process will mean that it is possible for bad apples
from the past to be transported into the new dispensation. There is also the
challenge of ‘double dipping’ by some judges who will be on bother the
Supreme Court and Constitutional court benches.